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as Discrimination Management
Audrey G. McFarlane

ABSTRACT
Mixed-income housing is an increasingly popular approach to providing affordable housing. The
technique largely went unnoticed until developers of mixed-income housing constructed buildings
containing separate entrances for rich and poor residents. The ensuing “poor door” controversy
illustrated that mixed-income housing, as both a method of affordable housing production and
an integration strategy, is in unacknowledged tension with itself. This Article argues that, mixedincome housing is implemented as a surreptitious form of racial and economic integration that
accommodates and replicates prevailing race and class assumptions detrimental to the needs and
interests of low to moderate-income individuals in need of housing. The mixed-income housing
strategy, at its heart, serves as a form of discrimination management—a way to work around the
race and class discriminatory impulses of residents within a development and within a particular
jurisdiction. The paper recommends ways in which to think more critically about this important
question of community design in ways that account more honestly for the limits and possibilities
of how we may choose to use affordable housing for race and class integration.
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INTRODUCTION
“I do not think this country can solve its urban problems, the
problems which we face in the American cities, until we take the
simple step of agreeing that we are going to live together, not
separately.”1
“The value and meaning of good neighbors…are one part of the
larger story of the moral uses of pluralism.”2
“Cities are difference engines, and one of the qualities they assign
is the place of class in space.”3
“Do I really want to be integrated into a burning house?”4

Rampant development and gentrification have transformed parts of
many inner cities into fabulous, expensive places to live, accessible to those
with the money to pay.5 Cities have welcomed this influx of the affluent as an
indicator of the success of local economic development policy: they’ve
succeeded in attracting people with resources to live, work and play.6 Yet one
need not look far to see that this market-based success has been accompanied
by displacement and exclusion. The high cost of housing in some areas is out
of reach for low-, moderate-, and even some upper-income residents. With
federal housing support in decline, a number of cities around the country (and
across the globe) are seeking to ease the transformation by encouraging new
housing developments to “mix in” some housing units that are comparatively
affordable into otherwise market rate developments.7 The costs of these
below-market price units are often offset by lucrative regulatory waivers or

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

114 CONG. REC. S2993 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, GOOD NEIGHBORS: THE DEMOCRACY OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN
AMERICA 13 (2016).
Michael Sorkin, What’s Behind the ‘Poor Door’?, NATION (April 2, 2014),
http://www.thenation.com/article/whats-behind-poor-door [https://perma.cc/UA3R-74WR].
JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 108 (1963).
See Saskia Sassen, Who Owns Our Cities—And Why This Urban Takeover Should Concern Us
All, GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2015, 3:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015
/nov/24/who-owns-our-cities-and-why-this-urban-takeover-should-concern-us-all
[https://perma.cc/FH4N-XEXP].
See generally Neil Smith, New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban
Strategy, 34 Antipode 427 (2002).
See generally INCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: AFFORDABLE
HOUSING, SOCIAL INCLUSION, AND LAND VALUE RECAPTURE (Nico Calavita & Alan
Mallach eds., 2010).
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tax breaks.8 This mixed-income policy has also been adopted on the opposite
end of the housing spectrum—the federal government is redeveloping
exclusively low-income public housing to be economically mixed.9 For the
most part, mixed-income housing is regarded favorably; many attractive,
well-designed developments have been and are being built without
controversy.10 Yet mixed-income housing as a policy for how housing should
be built has not been thoroughly examined for some hidden yet troubling
problems.
An indication of the hidden problems surfaced when developers of
mixed-income residential developments opted to physically separate the
wealthier residents from the lower-income residents by building separate
entrances to their buildings—a luxury entrance with a doorman, concierge,
and valet and a less elaborate, perfectly functional, entrance with a lock.11 In
other buildings, amenities like exercise facilities were off limits to the lowerincome residents even if they were able to pay.12 Separate entrances were

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

See Samuel Stein, Progress for Whom, Toward What? Progressive Politics and New York
City’s Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, 40 J. URB. AFF. 770 (2017); Ajay Garde,
Affordable by Design? Inclusionary Housing Insights From Southern California, 36 J.
PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 16 (2016) (suggesting other incentives such as design flexibility and
expedited processing).
See EDWARD G. GOETZ, NEW DEAL RUINS: RACE, ECONOMIC JUSTICE, AND PUBLIC HOUSING
POLICY (2013); Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project,
57 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1020 (2010) (noting the trend towards mixed income projects since the early
1970s); OFFICE POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., Confronting
Concentrated Poverty with a Mixed-Income Strategy, EVIDENCE MATTERS (Spring 2013),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/spring13/highlight1.html#title
[https://perma.cc/RJJ4-QHDD].
But some developers complain that the inclusionary housing schemes that embody the
mixed income principle come at the expense of their profits. See, e.g., 616 Croft Ave.,
L.L.C. v. City of West Hollywood, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); Cal. Bldg.
Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015).
For example, in London, developers produced a brochure for One Commercial Street on
the edge of the area of London called “the City”, which promising a “bespoke entrance
lobby . . . With the ambiance of a stylish hotel reception area [that] creates a stylish yet
secure transition space between your home and the City streets.” Hilary Osborne, Poor
Doors: The Segregation of London’s Inner-City Flat Dwellers, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2014,
2:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jul/25/poor-doors-segregationlondon-flats [https://perma.cc/52KP-QQS8] (noting “[e]ven bicycle storage spaces,
rubbish disposal facilities and postal deliveries are being separated”).
See, e.g., Melkorka Licea, ‘Poor Door’ Tenants of Luxury Tower Reveal the Financial Apartheid
Within, NY POST (Jan. 17, 2016, 1:48 AM) https://nypost.com/2016/01/17/poor-door-tenantsreveal-luxury-towers-financial-apartheid [https://perma.cc/FPC9-S575] (lower-income tenants
apartments look out on courtyard they are forbidden to use); Ronda Kaysen, What’s Next, a
Bouncer?, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/realestate/rentregulated-tenants-excluded-from-amenities.html [https://perma.cc/5HUM-KMQL] (rent regulated
tenants prevented from using building amenities possibly to encourage them to move); Bryce
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considered necessary to maintain exclusivity for the wealthier residents, who
sometimes paid millions of dollars for their units, while the lower-income
residents rented units for only several hundred dollars per month.13 Public
reaction to media reports about the separate entrances, or the poor door as it
was referred to,14 was swift and condemning.15 Separately designated
entrances were widely perceived as a modern iteration of separate and
unequal, a demeaning, discriminatory practice from the era of de jure
segregation.16 A form of housing development initially perceived as inclusive
and morally just was now deemed unjust as it turned lower-income residents
into second-class citizens in their own communities. Others, however,
shrugged off the suggestion that there was any problem with this
arrangement—separation based on ability to pay was “rational” and,
moreover, made sorely needed access to affordable housing in centrally
located places available.17
Poor doors may be merely a symptom of a larger problem of how we are
choosing to build housing based on market preferences, while also aspiring to
economically integrate in a society shaped by racial segregation and
discrimination. What if the problem arose from those market driven
preferences and practices (often premised on exclusion) being married with

13.

14.
15.
16.
17.

Covert, Luxury Apartment Building Will Have Separate Door for Poor Residents, THINK
PROGRESS (July 21, 2014, 1:01 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/luxury-apartment-building-willhave-separate-door-for-poor-residents-f0449766d474 [https://perma.cc/Q6XF-8NKL]. See
generally Lauren C. Wittlin, Access Denied: The Tale of Two Tenants and Building
Amenities, 31 TOURO L. REV. 615 (2015) (arguing tenants should have access to building
amenities through rent regulation prescribing a reasonable fee.).
See Mireya Navarro, ‘Poor Door’ in a New York Tower Opens a Fight Over Affordable
Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27
/nyregion/separate-entryways-for-new-york-condo-buyers-and-renters-create-anaffordable-housing-dilemma.html [https://perma.cc/F2JT-JG7L]; Osborne, supra note 11.
Covert, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Lucy Westcott, New York City Approves ‘Poor Door’ for Luxury Apartment
Building, NEWSWEEK (July 21, 2014, 5:49 PM), www.newsweek.com/new-york-city-approvespoor-door-luxury-apartment-building-260218 [https://perma.cc/HPN9-WABZ].
Id.
See e.g., Rick Jacobus, In Defense of the ‘Poor Door’, SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 14, 2015)
https://shelterforce.org/2015/10/14/in_defense_of_the_poor_door/ [https://perma.cc/32NJFJN3]; Carol Lamberg, Housing Priorities: Quality is More Important than the Number of
Entrances, DREAM REVISITED (March 2015) http://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/housingpriorities-quality-is-more-important-than-the-number-of-entrances [https://perma.cc/5ZZXNXWB]. Mixed-income housing has even made it into film. See Kate Wilson, Film: High Rise,
VARSITY (Oct. 9, 2015, 5:34 PM), https://www.varsity.co.uk/reviews/8948
[https://perma.cc/JK22-DVJ3] (describing mixed-income high rise where the elite live at
the top and the “commoners” live on the lower floors with competition to rise in the
social hierarchy causing the community to “descend[] into anarchy”).
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an effort to integrate (a policy of inclusion)? Then certainly the poor door
controversy reflects a problem with the underlying strategy of mixed-income
housing, an increasingly popular policy approach to provide both housing
integration and access to the city.
Mixed-income housing involves newly built buildings or communities that
contain units affordable to the wealthy as well as to moderate- and low-income
residents. The affordable units evince an economic integration strategy that can
involve a mix of incomes as well as a mix of ownership arrangements.18
Mixed-income housing embodies the highest ideals for an integrated
society—mutual understanding through diversity of neighbors in all stations
of life. Beyond the controversy of separate doors for the wealthy and the
nonwealthy, the debate over desirable or acceptable housing arrangements
invites us to examine the greater project and policy goals of mixed-income
housing itself. Mixed-income housing policy is at the unacknowledged center
of an unresolved tension between our aspirations for inclusion in the face of
a society and economy structured around separation, differentiation, and
exclusion. With much of society’s arrangements premised on segregation, at
best, only a part of our societal instinct is towards mixing. Arrangements as
fundamental and seemingly benign as our zoning system are based on
separation and class sorting—exclusion as well as uniformity of uses within a
particular zoning district—and real estate and other markets premised on
differentiation.19 Our aspiration today may be mixing, yet land use and other
law, as well as societal practices, have empowered separation.20
While it is generally not understood as such, mixed-income housing is a
poor door strategy itself. In a neoliberal, market-based conception of society,
mixed-income housing provides entrance to places off limits to people who
would otherwise be shut out. It is a way for the lower income and often, racial
minority groups, to gain access to housing in central places in the face of
growing housing shortages. It is also a tactical strategy to circumvent
18.
19.

20.

See Anouk K. Tersteeg, Fenne M. Pinkster, “Us Up Here and Them Down There”: How
Design, Management, and Neighborhood Facilities Shape Social Distance in a MixedTenure Housing Development, 52 URB. AFF. REV. 751 (2016).
See generally Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Classification Situations: Life-Chances in
the Neoliberal Era, 42 HIST. SOCIAL RES. 23 (2017) (discussing the use of actuarial scores
to classify people for consumer credit, insurance, real estate and employment creating
markets that structure individual life chances); Annette B. Kolis, Citadels of Privilege:
Exclusionary Land Use Regulations and the Presumption of Constitutional Validity, 8
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 585 (1981) (reviewing exclusionary land use regulatory devices
and arguing they should not be subject to the traditional deferential standards of review).
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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objections to affordable housing development by, in effect, unobtrusively
ushering the poor into otherwise affluent developments. Mixed-income
housing also quietly uses economic integration to respond to residential racial
segregation. The racial integration we pursue today is the problem that was
not solved by the Fair Housing Act: segregation of Black, lower-income
people, the non-middle class.21 The type of housing needed is not being
constructed in sufficient numbers. Stigmatized Black racial identity is
combined with the stigma of low income in a capitalist society.22 Since 1968,
non-middle class racial integration in housing has been persistently yet
unsuccessfully sought—a goal now made even further elusive by rising
economic inequality.23 Paradoxically, rising inequality is accompanied by an
attachment by many to consumption of material goods, such as housing, to
provide economic status and identity. For this and other reasons, the stakes
are high when it comes to housing. One’s self concept, one’s shelter, and likely
one’s largest financial investment are all tied up in housing. Access to the
perceived good life is premised on wealth. Wealth, and who does or does not
have it in the United States, is stubbornly tied to race. Racial segregation has
manifested in the persistence of hyper-impoverished neighborhoods that are
burdened with terrible economic and health statistics.24 Since 1968, this racebased class segregation has proven so intractable that sophisticated mobility
strategies premised on mixed-income housing have proven necessary to allow
individuals to navigate around the exclusionary metropolis.25
Mixed-income housing and its integrationist goal face many challenges
that have been inadequately addressed. Because the policy was designed, in
part, as a surreptitious workaround to objections to low-income housing,26
this paper argues that the policy has also by necessity had to accommodate
enduring expectations and practices for race and class separation and
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

The Fair Housing Act of 1968 succeeded mainly in freeing black middle- and upper-class people
to live in areas where they had the money to purchase. See infra text accompanying notes
163–170.
See generally IYIOLA SOLANKE, DISCRIMINATION AS STIGMA: A THEORY OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
LAW (2017) (providing a detailed analysis of stigma being at the heart of discrimination
that should be protected against under law).
See generally PETER TEMIN, THE VANISHING MIDDLE CLASS: PREJUDICE AND POWER IN A
DUAL ECONOMY 129–31 (2017) (attributing a dual residential system to rising economic
inequality).
See Douglas S. Massey & Jonathan Tannen, A Research Note on Trends in Black
Hypersegregation, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1025 (2015).
See Patrick Sharkey, Residential Mobility and the Reproduction of Unequal Neighborhoods, 14
CITYSCAPE 9 (2012).
See Alexander POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX 352(2006) (describing the ways in
which suburban towns exclude affordable housing).

Discrimination Management

1147

exclusion. The poor door controversy dramatically illustrates that mixed-income
communities defer to discrimination by implicitly taking race and class
preferences into account when designing new developments, as well as in
zoning rules that set minimum percentage thresholds for inclusionary units.
Both internally within the residential product created and externally to the
surrounding host community, mixed-income housing is both a response to
and tacit embrace of discrimination. It incorporates discrimination’s norms
and assumptions, and then seeks to manage it. Such discrimination
management seems realistic and expedient; but right now, efforts to manage
discrimination operate within in a vacuum that has not considered the
implications nor consequences of accepting such discrimination.
As the mixed-income principle in housing has grown from voluntary
state inclusionary laws to the preferred approach in federal housing policy,
there has been little to no examination of mixed-income housing’s origins as
a response to racial segregation, it’s normative goals, or the race and class
assumptions embedded in how we define a good community. Little
normative guidance exists for how existing discrimination should be
managed. This paper argues that when the goal is integration, rigorously
identifying integration’s reasonably expected benefits should guide
discrimination management. As the discussion will show, this is more
difficult than it sounds since integration comes with paradoxical challenges.
One significant challenge is that segregation is highly valued and reflects a
concerted effort to maintain social domination.27 This reality suggests that
discrimination management should not disadvantage the group presumably
targeted to benefit from these schemes. At the very least, discrimination
management should be openly discussed and interrogated to ensure that the
housing policy of our time does not replicate the very assumptions and
structures that subordinate the purported beneficiaries of inclusionary,
mixed-income housing programs. Developing antisubordination norms for
discrimination management in this context requires situating mixed-income
housing within the context that lead to its genesis—a response to racial
segregation and segregation’s quest for maintenance of social domination and
efforts to promote the creation of integrative affordable housing. Only then
can we consider both the promising and troubling aspects of the segregated
society reflected in mixed-income housing schemes.
The poor door controversy offers a timely opportunity to consider the
tension inherent in our present version of the inclusive city—one of

27.

See infra text accompanying notes 88–92.
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separation and segregation based on ability to pay combined with a fixation
on luxury and exclusivity. In this context, mixed-income housing may be
both the right and the wrong way to address segregation. Right in the sense
that it responds to the constraints of present realities. Wrong because it fails
to honestly consider society’s acceptance and incorporation of segregation. In
light of how persistent segregation is, it is important to consider the needs
segregation fulfills and which of segregation’s values we actually reject. The
quick answer would be racism certainly. But we too often consider racism to
be merely about attitudes rather than structural or systemic. We often fail to ask
why racism is so structurally embedded in all aspects of society. Social
domination theory provides helpful insight into how and why segregation is
valued. The poor door can then properly be understood and assessed within
a social and legal context that embraces both integrationist aspirations and
segregated realities embedded within markets.
Part I of this Article discusses the poor door controversy and the clash it
reflects between the competing values of housing as access (to material goods
like shelter) and housing as a psychic good (consisting of status derived from
living in a community that is exclusive to those who are similarly situated).
Part II of the Article explains why it is important to understand that structural
racism, in the form of racial segregation, is at the heart of mixed-income
housing policy. This Part demonstrates how concerted efforts over the
twentieth century to racially segregate reflect an unquestioned need for social
domination and thus presents a formidable obstacle to dismantling racialized
housing. Part III of the paper critiques mixed-income housing as a form of
discrimination management. Because mixed-income policy surreptitiously
addresses racial segregation under cover of the more politically expedient goal
of economic integration, it renders invisible the policy’s deliberate choices to
manage discrimination, its perpetuation of racial subordination and its very
real consequences.

I.

THE POOR DOOR CONTROVERSY

In 2014, the planned construction of a luxury residential condominium
tower in New York City captured the public’s attention for a very unusual
reason. The 219 unit building, intended for a high-income clientele with the
units marketed at a price point of approximately $1 million to $26 million,
included amenities such as “a gym, a swimming pool, a bowling alley, a rockclimbing wall, an indoor playground, a squash court, [and] a golf
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simulator . . . .”28 Even though the building was privately built and intended
to house the very high end of the real estate market, the developer took
advantage of a number of available tax incentive programs under which, inter
alia, property taxes were abated for a number of years.29 In return for the
valuable tax benefits, the developer was obliged to list a percentage of the units in
the building at a price point affordable to low- and moderate-income renters.30
This type of inclusionary requirement uses existing zoning regulations to
encourage affordable housing construction wherever centrally located,
market rate housing is built.31 Approximately 27 states and the District of
Columbia have adopted mandatory or voluntary Inclusionary Housing
programs.32 The ordinances typically offer tax incentives and regulatory
waivers that allow developers to increase profit by increasing the height and
bulk of their developments, allowing them to build more units than would
otherwise be permissible under governing zoning ordinances.33 Mixedincome housing has also been prioritized in the redevelopment of public
housing in the Hope VI program.34 As the biggest source of funding for
affordable housing development today, the federal Low Income Housing Tax
Credit program reflects a mixed-income housing policy goal as well.35

28.
29.

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Navarro, supra note 13.
See generally ALESSANDRO BUSÀ, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF NEW YORK CITY:
ENGINEERING THE CITY FOR THE ELITE 65 (2017) (describing the impact of New York
City’s 421-a tax abatement program on the proliferation of luxury housing). See also
Robert Hickey et al., Achieving Lasting Affordability Through Inclusionary Housing
18 (Lincoln Inst. Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP14RH1, 2014),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/achieving-lasting-affordabilitythrough-inclusionary-housing-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9B2-D2FF] (noting that to date,
twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted inclusionary zoning
ordinances).
See generally Seth B. Cohen, Teaching an Old Policy New Tricks: The 421-A Tax Program
and the Flaws of Trickle-Down Housing, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 757, 772 (2008) (describing the
available abatements under New York City’s inclusionary housing program).
See id. at 18 (analyzing a set of twenty inclusionary housing programs). See also OFFICE POLICY DEV.
& RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., Inclusionary Zoning and Mixed-Income
Communities, EVIDENCE MATTERS (Spring 2013) https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals
/em/spring13/highlight3.html#title [https://perma.cc/78PU-UTJX].
See generally Hickey et al., supra note 29.
See Audrey G. McFarlane & Randall K. Johnson, Cities, Inclusion and Exactions, 102
IOWA L. REV. 2145, 2157 (2017).
Lawrence J. Vale & Shomon Shamsuddin, All Mixed Up: Making Sense of Mixed-Income
Housing Developments, 83 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 56 (2017).
Raquel Smith, A Seat at the Table: Changing the Governing Structure of Low Income
Housing Tax Credit Program Administration to Reflect Civil Rights Values and Fair
Housing, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 193, 199 (2016).
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Developers are often allowed, in return, to build taller building
containing a greater number of units (density bonuses) or receive tax breaks
that allow the developer, in theory to recoup costs of the income foregone for
the required percentage of inclusionary units. One could call the market rate
units unsubsidized, but in fact the market units were subsidized as well
through the tax abatement. Such units that are set aside for rental by low- or
moderate-income residents and are often built with cheaper finishes and
fewer amenities within the unit.36 Outside of the unit, however, the
inclusionary units are indistinguishable from the market rate units and are
typically supposed to be unobtrusively mixed in throughout the development.
It is not uncommon for some inclusionary zoning laws to allow developers to opt
out of inclusionary requirements, allowing them to instead build units off site
(in another location), or instead the developer may contribute to an affordable
housing fund.37 For example, the New York City (NYC) program allowed
developers to receive tax breaks if they offered affordable housing at the site
or within a half mile of the site.38
In contrast to the typical inclusionary yet unobtrusive dispersal
approach, the Extell Building’s developer took advantage of an amendment to
the NYC rules which allowed the units to be grouped together in one area of
the building, “in an attached segment of the building.”39 The developer
planned to build a separate entrance for the affordable units all located in one
lower corner of the building. This section was walled off from access to the

36.
37.
38.

39.

See, e.g., URBAN INST., EXPANDING HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH INCLUSIONARY ZONING:
LESSONS FROM TWO COUNTIES (2012), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/HUD496_new.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVK9-7H3R].
See, e.g., Tim Iglesias, Framing Inclusionary Zoning: Exploring the Legality of Local
Inclusionary Zoning and Its Potential to Meet Affordable Housing Needs, 36 ZONING &
PLAN. L. REP. 1, 4 (2013).
Alexandra Schwartz, The “Poor Door” and The Glossy Reconfiguration of City Life, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/thepoor-door-and-the-glossy-reconfiguration-of-city-life [https://perma.cc/NQ8B-ZCYL]. But
see Emily Badger, When Separate Doors for The Poor Are More Than They Seem, WASH. POST
(July 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/31/when-the-poorwant-their-own-door [https://perma.cc/RU5H-8WXL] (describing “Portner Place, a complex of
garden-style Section 8 apartments . . . [in] Washington, D.C . . . . slated for redevelopment into a
roughly 350-unit mixed-income property that will include two wings: one for market-rate
professionals eager to live near the U Street scene, and the other for Portner Place’s existing
residents, plus another 48 units of affordable housing meant for households making less
than 60 percent of the area median income. The wings will have separate entrances, off
separate streets. Portner Place’s current tenants requested this.”).
Shannon Ayala, Upper West Side Board Is Crafting an Anti-Poor Door Proposal, CURBED N.Y.
(Oct. 10, 2014, 1:40 PM), http://ny.curbed.com/2014/10/10/10037458/upper-west-side-boardis-crafting-an-anti-poor-door-proposal [https://perma.cc/5WFV-7A9W].
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main part of the building that contained the luxury amenities and from
interaction with the market rate tenants.40 The City approved the plans that
included the wealthy apartments facing the water and the poor apartments
having an entrance in the back, facing the street.41 The two sets of residents
would have two different entrances—a luxury entrance for the 219 market
rate condos, where unit owners would have a doorman, concierge and valet,
while the entrance for the fifty-five income-restricted, rental unit tenants42
would be separate and less elaborate with just a lock on the front door.43
A public uproar ensued. The term “poor door” was coined to poke fun and
point a shaming finger at exclusionary practices that were themselves shaming. Not
only was the public shocked at the separate door arrangement, members of the
public seemed doubly offended because the developer would receive tax
credits and highly lucrative permission to build a taller building in return for
providing more modest, income restricted, affordable units in the
development.44 There was a sense that what the developer had done was
repugnant—he had essentially segregated a new community, seemingly
placing us on a slippery slope towards the old practices of separate but
unequal treatment—separate entrances, water fountains, public restroom,
seating areas in restaurants, sitting in the back of buses. It also resonated with
the sense of exclusion even the middle class are feeling in an expensive global
city like New York.45

40.

41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

See Daniel R. Jones, We Need Stronger Rent Laws, Not Developer Giveaways, URB.
AGENDA (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.cssny.org/news/entry/we-need-stronger-rent-lawsnot-developer-giveaways [https://perma.cc/GZS7-SW28] (brief description of the
history of the genesis and inefficiencies of the 421—a tax incentive program which was
“created in the 1970s at a time when private residential construction in the city had
collapsed . . . . By the 1980s, any justification for the program was . . . weak. But the
city’s powerful real estate industry was not about to part ways with the subsidy. So
legislators found a way to keep the program alive by adding “affordability” requirements
and thereby giving it a new justification”).
In response to the uproar, the quality of the door finishes was upgraded to include a glass
façade and “custom-wood” and to face a planned public park instead of the side street.
Laura Kusisto, A ‘Poor Door’ on a Planned New York Apartment Tower with Affordable
Housing Gets a Makeover, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 29, 2014, 9:37 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-poor-door-on-a-planned-new-york-apartment-towerwith-affordable-housing-gets-a-makeover-1409276266 [https://perma.cc/CRR8-36JC].
New UWS Development Could Have Separate Entrance for Poorer People, WEST SIDE RAG (Aug.
12, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.westsiderag.com/2013/08/12/new-uws-development-couldhave-separate-entrance-for-poorer-people [https://perma.cc/E2AD-XEZG].
Id.
Id.
Some argue that the middle class and affluent benefit the most from affordable housing
programs:
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The Extell building became the lightning rod of the rising inequality in a
city experiencing rapid, hyper gentrification with prices rising above a price
point that upper-income people would find unaffordable. Unbeknownst to
the New York public, other buildings in the City quietly used the poor doors
as well.46 For example, in an already existing building in New York with
separate entrances, one 34-year-old bank employee tenant who wanted to
remain anonymous for fear of jeopardizing her one-bedroom rental
complained: “We can’t even use the pool or the gym. I’ve asked and offered
to pay. It’s kind of messed up.”47 48 And poor doors have been an international
inclusionary housing problem. For example, Vancouver, Canada, quietly used
poor doors, until the controversy in New York sparked a debate in Vancouver.49 A
similar building was also contemplated in Toronto.50 Similar buildings in
London caused a large public outcry in the city including a protest march.51
The London protests, which were centered on already completed
projects, are useful for understanding some of the lived experience in
buildings with poor doors. The setting for the London controversy is a hyper

46.

47.
48.
49.
50.

51.

Take Manhattan’s 606 West 57th Street, a 1025-unit building to be put up
by developer TF Cornerstone. In exchange for setting aside 220 of those
apartments for ‘lower income’ tenants, the developer will get a local real
estate tax exemption, tax-exempt financing, Low Income Housing Tax
Credits (in which banks kick in equity in exchange for a tax rebate), and
permission to build a larger building than the zoning code would otherwise
allow.
Jim Epstein, New York City’s Affordable Housing Bonanza for The Rich, REASON (July 3,
2014, 4:31 PM), http://reason.com/archives/2014/07/03/new-york-citys-affordablehousing-bonanz [https://perma.cc/ME8D-GQTG]
Brentin Mock, No More ‘Poor Doors’ in NYC, CITYLAB (July 1, 2015),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/07/no-more-poor-doors-in-nyc/397499
[https://perma.cc/7KL7-V5BU] (describing planned mixed-income development that will use
separate buildings: “In Brooklyn, developers of the Greenpoint Landing project are
preserving three of its planned 10 buildings for units subsidized for low-income tenants.
Those three buildings will contain 300 affordable units. When all of the buildings are
complete, some wealthier residents will not have to share vestibules with poorer
neighbors, though they will live within the same complex.”).
Navarro, supra note 13.
Id.
Jeff Lee, New Vancouver Highrise to Have Separate Door for Social Housing, VANCOUVER SUN
(May 5, 2015) http://www.vancouversun.com/Vancouver+highrise+have+separate
+door+social+housing/11031424/story.html [https://perma.cc/QDS9-CLPG].
Jessica Smith Cross, Separate Entrances: Are New York-style ‘Poor Doors’ Here in Toronto
Already?, TORONTO METRO (Sep. 3, 2014), http://www.metronews.ca/news/toronto/2014
/09/03/separate-entrances-are-new-york-style-poor-doors-here-in-toronto-already.html
[https://perma.cc/RR6C-DB39]. See Martine August, Revitalisation Gone Wrong: MixedIncome Public Housing Redevelopment in Toronto’s Don Mount Court, 53 URB. STUD. 16 (2016).
See generally, Chris Low, Developers Installed 'Poor Doors' and 'Rich Doors' On a Block of London
Flats, Vice News (Aug. 22, 2014) (noting protests in London over poor doors).
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gentrification possibly worse than New York’s, that is largely putting the
entire city out of the reach of all but the very wealthy. The Grenfell Towers
burnt shell, the site of many lives lost to fire, stands as a symbol of the dim
prospects for the poor to remain in the neighborhoods that have gentrified
around them.52 The context heightened the perception that poor doors
represented a stigmatizing separate but unequal policy. One London tenant of an
existing building with a luxury entrance for the market rate tenants and a plain
entrance for the lower-income tenants, explained the hurt of the separation:
“We know our place,” Donna says bitterly, her eyes filling with
tears. “They’ve made sure of that. It’s us and them. I’ve never felt
poorer in my life because of the way we’re kept apart. “It’s not about
the quality of the building. I’m grateful for the help I’ve had from
the housing association. But being kept apart makes us feel like
scum. We’re second-class citizens. I don’t want my kids thinking
they deserve to be treated differently. It’s humiliating and wrong.”
Donna also claim[ed] her children have been “ridiculed and sworn
at” by posh neighbors[.] (emphasis added)53

No such overt conflict was reported in New York, yet the message there is
palpable. “Buildings that segregate entrances for lower-income and middle-class
tenants are an affront to our values,” said Manhattan Borough President Gale
Brewer.54 According to Assemblywoman Linda Rosenthal:
This ‘separate but equal’ arrangement is abominable and has no
place in the 21st century, let alone on the Upper West Side . . . . A
mandatory affordable housing plan is not license to segregate
lower-income tenants from those who are well-off. The developer
must follow the spirit as well the letter of the law when building

52.

53.

54.

A West London tower block building, one of the last housing structures affordable to
low-income residents, in a heavily gentrified area burned to the ground killing 71
residents. The cause of the fire was the purely aesthetic exterior cladding that acted like
an accelerant, which, when combined with blocked passageways, resulted in a terrible
loss of life and the homelessness for 209 families. Sam Knight, The Year the Grenfell
Tower Fire Revealed the Lie That Londoners Tell Themselves, NEW YORKER (Dec. 27,
2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/2017-in-review/the-year-the-grenfell-towerfire-revealed-the-lie-that-londoners-tell-themselves [https://perma.cc/TH63-QMXE].
Gemma Aldridge, ‘Poor Doors’ Scandal: Separate Entrances for Wealthy and Housing Association
Tenants at Apartment Blocks, MIRROR (Aug. 2, 2014, 6:31
PM),
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/poor-doors-scandal-separate-entrances-3954389
[https://perma.cc/DL2X-ACP4].
Cyril Josh Barker, City Approves ‘Poor Door’ for Affordable Housing Residents, AMSTERDAM
NEWS, (July 24, 2014, 9:15 AM), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2014/jul/24/city-approvespoor-door/ [https://perma.cc/VP4M-3QQ6].
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affordable housing, and this plan is clearly not what was intended
by the community.” 55

But as certain as the critics have been that this poor door plan was
objectionable on its face, there were equal, if not greater, numbers of others who
questioned why the separate doors were considered a problem. This was
reinforced by the results of the lottery that was held for the fifty-five units available
in the Extell building. Approximately 88,000 people applied for one of the
apartments.56 An affordable apartment, even under possibly demeaning
circumstances, was a worthwhile tradeoff in an impossibly tight and expensive
real estate market. Thus, there have been a variety of responses to the poor door
controversy and whether such separate entrances are objectionable or justifiable
as discussed below.
A.

The Technical, Rationalist Response

Notwithstanding the headlines, the predominant argument in the poor
door debate was that the separate doors had nothing to do with an effort by
the developer to exclude, but simply reflected a necessary configuration in
order to make the deal work financially. Because the project was subject to
often competing regulatory requirements for different sources of subsidy, the
implicit argument was that the exclusion was out of developers’ hands.
Accordingly, the developers repeatedly asserted that the affordable housing
section of the building was a “legally separate entity.”57 First, in order to get
the density bonus for including the affordable housing unit the developer
needed the proportion of extremely low-income tenants to be 60 percent.58

55.
56.

57.

58.

WEST SIDE RAG, supra note 42.
Mireya Navarro, 88,000 Applicants and Counting for 55 Units in ‘Poor Door’ Building,
N.Y. TIMES (April 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/nyregion/poordoor-building-draws-88000-applicants-for-55-rental-units.html
[https://perma.cc/85SP-8F22].
The project also received a floor area bonus from the provision of affordable units, which
the developer did not use to expand the floor area of the Extell Building, instead selling
the bonus to other buildings within half a mile of the site. See Letter from Howard
Lowenstein, Extell Attorney, to Matthew Diller (June 4, 2013) (on file with author) (“The
developer says that by building the affordable units it will earn credits allowing it to sell
rights to other nearby developers that will let them add more floor area.”). See also WEST
SIDE RAG, supra note 42.
See generally Seth B. Cohen, Teaching an Old Policy New Tricks: The 421-A Tax Program
and the Flaws of Trickle-Down Housing, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 757, 764 (2008); Samuel Stein, Progress
for Whom, Toward What? Progressive Politics and New York City’s Mandatory Inclusionary
Housing, 40 J. URB. AFF., 770 (describing the New York City 421-A program, a tax abatement
program used to subsidize the Extell building).
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For example, Low Income Housing Tax Credits require a certain percentage
of a building to be dedicated to very low to low-income housing.59 But,
apparently, this argument is not quite true. Other inclusionary housing
buildings had units mixed in within the entire development.
The other concern might be that, particularly in a condominium
building, the common charges are paid by unit owners. Low-income
residents could not afford to pay the maintenance charges and therefore they
could not own condominium units. But, this problem could easily be handled
by the units being owned together as an entity while nevertheless being
scattered throughout the building, or perhaps confined to the lower, less
expensive, noisier floors.
Perhaps the explanation is no more complicated than the developer had
applied to participate in New York City’s Inclusionary Housing Program,
making the project eligible for additional lucrative floor area in exchange for
providing affordable housing units in the project or at another location. That
law had been explicitly amended to allow low-income units to be placed
elsewhere than on site. It may be that Extell simply took advantage of a
deliberate loophole that allowed them the perceived benefit of locating lowerincome tenants out of sight and being able to market the building for its
exclusiveness rather than inclusiveness.
B.

The Economic Realist Response

Mixed-income housing posits that regardless of income, residents of a
community will be indistinguishably economically integrated.60 As many
voices that were raised in opposition to the separate and unequal poor door, there
were a considerable number of others who found the poor door arrangement
indistinguishable from the class distinctions that are made in private and
public accommodations every day. There are services provided by class on
trains. On airplanes first class is separated by a curtain from coach.61 Hotels
59.

60.
61.

Smith, supra note 35, at 200 (“For a period of fifteen years, a property owner must rent
at least twenty percent of the project’s units to households with incomes at or below fifty
percent of the area median gross income or rent at least forty percent of the units to
households with incomes at or below sixty percent of the area median gross income in
order to qualify for the [LIHTC] program.”).
See Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s Contributions to Both Affordable
Housing and Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 585 (2015).
Tanvi Misra, The Consequences of Airplane Classism, CITYLAB (May 2, 2016),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2016/05/the-consequences-of-airplaneclassism/480813 [https://perma.cc/9GWL-QKTH] (stating flights with first-class cabins
are more likely to cause passengers to act out).
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are distinguished by the price point that reflects the high, medium, or low
quality of services. Also, neighborhoods and buildings are segregated by the
expense of the building product. In urban areas, though it is not often thought
of as such, luxury buildings with doormen are a form of gated community. If
one wants entrée to a higher-class neighborhood, one need simply to pay.
Free choice is only limited by one’s resources. Thus, economic segregation
appears reasonable, as you consume what you can afford.
Perhaps the difference is the class distinction within one’s residence.
Usually, class distinctions manifest outside of the home. Also, the other classbased distinctions are limited in time—a few hours on a train, plane, or in a
hotel. Home class-based distinctions are more permanent. Living with the
class distinction up close is much more difficult and potentially stigmatizing.
This of course begs the question: If up close distinctions based on class and
income are not tolerable, then why have mixed-income living arrangements
in the first place? Other values must be at play in order to arrive at such an
approach that are contrary to our present orientation towards luxury and
consumption that hides what is less than pleasant in our society behind a
veneer of perfection.62
C.

The Pragmatic Advocacy Response

The pragmatic response to the poor door controversy focused on the
expediency of the poor door buildings creating much needed housing.
Because the 88,000 people applying for the fifty-five spots have been so beaten
down by the structural realities of segregated and unequal housing
opportunities, they were willing to accept some stigmatization—perhaps they
view the cost of stigma as being less than the cost of living in housing that is
substandard and/or unaffordable. In addition, the fifty-five lottery winners are
located in an opportunity-rich neighborhood in terms of jobs, schools, and
transportation. The cities are only trying to offset the grievous problem of lack of
affordable housing by incentivizing private developers to build mixed-income,
inclusionary housing. It seems a win-win because some is better than none—
these developments would not have any affordable housing. If the developers
complied by building separate entrances for market-rate unit and low-income
unit tenants, then many seem to assume this is a negligible price for an affordable

62.

See MICHAEL SORKIN, VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE
END OF PUBLIC SPACE (1992) (explaining how theme park concepts drive privatized urban
development and shape and control expectations for an “experience” that does not admit
the reality of a less than perfect, stratified society).

Discrimination Management

1157

place to live. As a matter of policy, the question remains whether one should have
to endure stigma in order to obtain housing. It would seem that it should be an
unconstitutional condition to have to surrender one’s dignity for a privilege of
being affordably housed.63
D.

Acceptable Market-Based Discrimination or Invalid
Race and Class Discrimination?

Mixed-income housing is an approach to housing that responds to
several explicit and implicit dimensions of racial discrimination in land use.64
In particular, this question arises wherever there is an appreciable black
population, due to a long history of racial discrimination. As I argued in an
earlier article, these race differences often track class differences (for example,
differences in socioeconomic status, income, and wealth) though not
necessarily so. Class is a racialized concept in the United States, and questions
of economic justice are intertwined with racial justice.65

63.

64.

65.

See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1415 (1989) (“The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may
not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right,
even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”).
See generally Desmond S. King & Rogers M. Smith, Racial Orders in American Political
Development, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75–92 (2005) (suggesting a conceptual framework
for understanding mixed-income housing and its lessons). King and Smith argue that
the proper mode of analysis is to consider the interaction of race and politics and the
historical truth that systems of racial hierarchy have dominated United States politics.
Id. at 75. Thus, we should consider housing policy in the United States, in general, and
mixed-income housing policy in particular as reflecting two competing “racial
institutional orders” with competing ideologies in which the balance of power has
changed over time. Id. One is a “white supremacist” order and the other is an
“egalitarian transformative” order. Id. at 75–76. According to King and Smith, “most
political actors possess partly conflicting identities and interests . . . [which in
combination with] preexisting contexts define the problems and options actors face . . . .”
Id. at 76.
Several scholars have discussed the intersection between racial justice and economic
justice:
The literature has long acknowledged an intersection between race and
class, but there has been little actual exploration of the meaning of this
interaction and its significance for antidiscrimination theory . . . . [R]ace, as the
central barrier to a black person's opportunities, may change as class changes.
Class is something that can be deployed in certain circumstances to deflect
racial stigma and disadvantage suggests that race is inaccurately conceptualized
as fixed or absolute. It might instead be only nearly fixed and nearly absolute, a
slight albeit noteworthy shift signaling issues that might have to be faced fully if
and when improvement in economic conditions for Blacks continues. Class is
conceptualized or mythologized as fluid because it can be manipulated by
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Thus, even in supposedly race neutral housing schemes, race and class
differences are interacting in an overlapping, unspoken ways that result in
perplexing controversies like the poor door. Assessing the propriety of the
poor doors and income based distinctions in access to amenities in mixedincome housing requires considering the overarching policy reasons for
adopting the mixed-income principle in the first place. The emphasis on
income mixing suggests a perceived value from connection and access for
people of different income brackets to be in the same places. Indeed, the data,
suggests that the trend in U.S. housing development is towards greater
economic segregation.66 The literature also reveals that economic segregation
is an even greater problem when viewed through the lens of race.67 Yet the
story of class is intertwined with the story of race. The black and poor in the
United States are the most segregated group by far.68 In the context of the
United States’ protracted history of racial segregation, the quest for racial
integration undeniably undergirds inclusionary housing’s mixed income,
racially neutral, class-based strategy. Racial integration as a policy goal lingers
in the background, undefined, undiscussed, and unfulfilled. This unresolved
tension is exacerbated by the U.S. Supreme Court having read racial
integration out of constitutional jurisprudence.69 The Court only recently
affirmed that avoiding racial isolation and achieving diversity constitute a
compelling government interest, yet it still struggles to reconcile the efforts to
address persistent racial disparities in ways considered acceptably race neutral
or even colorblind.70 In addition, concerns about racial segregation are

66.
67.
68.
69.

70.

acquisition of material things. But there might likewise be changes in the
perception of one's race as one travels through different strata of class.
Audrey G. McFarlane, Operatively White?: Exploring the Significance of Race and Class
Through the Paradox of Black Middle-Classness, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 163, 184–85 (2009).
See generally RICHARD FLORIDA & CHARLOTTA MELLANDER, MARTIN PROSPERITY INST.,
SEGREGATED CITY: THE GEOGRAPHY OF ECONOMIC SEGREGATION IN AMERICA’S METROS, (2015)
http://martinprosperity.org/media/Segregated%20City.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQZ5-64BH].
See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
See generally Massey & Tannen, supra note 24, at 1025.
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (invalidating a school integration remedy that
required crossing school district jurisdictional boundaries because it arose from defacto not
dejure segregation); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(upholding a town’s exclusion of an integrated housing development for failing to show
intentional racial discrimination).
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (rejecting integrative school assignment plan because use of racial categories was
not sufficiently narrowly tailored); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(holding that the Texas system of school finance which resulted in well-funded schools and
impoverished schools did not violate Equal Protection). But see Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
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considered old fashioned, out of date, and politically incendiary because the
status of racial integration and diversity in contemporary American culture is
being seriously questioned.71
Mixed-income housing as our integration strategy and the poor door
controversy reveals the unaddressed tensions simmering beneath the surface
of mixed-income housing policy. The most significant tension is that the
policy seeks to circumvent discrimination by managing it.

II.
A.

MIXING AND THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Mixing as Utopian Social Ideal

Mixed-income housing embodies idealized notions of social mixing,
whose origins within a line of utopian thinking date back to the late 1800s.
Mixing was integral to ideas about desirable community design—seen as
egalitarian, providing ‘balance,’ and making common sense.72 This notion of
balance was at once conservative and romantic—harkening back to notions
of the rural village as a model of interaction but maintaining a sense of
everyone having their designated social place.73 The famously successful
Garden City movement, while adopting a limited form of social mixing,
spread the idea of mixing as a normative goal.74 The communities were
intended to contain “a cross-section of society” at the macro level, but
communities were also segregated by class “on the micro-level.”75 The
assumption was that the lower class would reap advantage from contact with

71.

72.

73.

74.
75.

Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (recognizing disparate impact as
a basis of FHA liability but requiring proof of causation).
Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Local Knowledge in the History of the Civil Rights Movement, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1018 (2019) (reviewing TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA
AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2012)) (describing how “[l]aw,
including Supreme Court decisions, often helped and hindered the participants in civil rightsera controversies in unexpected ways . . . ”).
See Sarah Glynn, Regeneration as a Trojan Horse, in WHERE THE OTHER HALF LIVES:
LOWER INCOME HOUSING IN A NEOLIBERAL WORLD 77 (Sarah Glynn ed., 2009) (discussing
the idea of tenure mix and mixed-income housing to as early as 1838 when a UK
parliamentary Select Committee argued “seclusion from ‘the observation and influence
of better educated neighbours’ in the dense London slums resulted in a ‘state of moral
degradation.’”).
BOURNVILLE VILL. TR., THE BOURNVILLE VILAGE TRUST, 1900–1955, 19 (1956) (discussing
an early utopian development, Bourneville near Birmingham U.K. in the 1890s aimed at
“gathering together as mixed a community as possible applied to the character and
interests as well as to the income and social class”). See also Wendy Sarkissian, The Idea
of Social Mix in Town Planning: An Historical Review, 13 URB. STUD. 231, 235 (1976).
See EBENEZER HOWARD, GARDEN CITIES OF TOMORROW (1902).
See Sarkissian, supra note 73, at 235.
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higher classes, likely as a consequence of the functional need for a range of
employment.76
The most consistent, modern proponent of mixing was historian and
sociologist Lewis Mumford. His social philosophy opposed segregation in
any form as being artificial, destructive of cultural unity, and detrimental to
society.77 According to Mumford, the issue was a functional one:
[T[he city, if it is to function effectively, cannot be a segregated
environment: the city with the single class, with a single social
stratum, with a single type of industrial activity, offers fewer
possibilities for the higher forms of human achievement than a
many-sided urban environment.78

Notwithstanding Mumford’s views, with few exceptions, the approach
to community design that was actually practiced during the twentieth century
involved social separation along race and class lines, rather than mixing. At
the time, the reality of residential living patterns followed a norm of stringent
racial segregation.79 Also, according to planner Wendy Sarkissian, “American
housing and planning legislation since 1954 has . . . inefficiently[] emphasized
social mix at the neighborhood level.”80 Such “[m]ix distinctly favoured the
middle class.”81 She further noted, however, “neither the degree of mix nor
the means of achieving mix was spelled out very clearly.”82 Nevertheless,
during the Cold War era, these general notions of social mixing and the
socially balanced neighborhood as a planning goal allowed the United States

76.

77.
78.
79.
80.

81.
82.

See id. at 236. Another Garden City proponent, Sennett opposed micro mixing—“residential
segregation by class was essential,” he thought and “any greater degree of mix” would mean “a
dead level of equality” and hence mediocrity. Id. at 236. Yet another Garden City contemporary,
however, advocated residential mix for three reasons: (1) Aesthetics—exposure to beautiful
buildings; (2) Social—"all classes may live in kindly neighborliness” and (3) Functional—“the
factory worker and the brain worker in the same district . . . is . . . expressly desirable.”). Id.
Id. at 237.
LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES 486 (1938).
See Sarkissian, supra note 73, at 239.
Id. at 240. Sarkissian argues that the Housing Act of 1954 (urban renewal), the New
Communities Act of 1968, and efforts to adopt inclusionary zoning in Fairfax County in
the early 1970s were all “attempts to increase opportunities for low-income and black
families to live in neighborhoods which would otherwise have been racially or socially
homogeneous.” Id. With regards to urban renewal, Sarkissian asserts that urban renewal
was pro-mix—“on the assumption that mix contributed to community stability and
would stem movement of the upper classes to the suburbs.” Id. at 241. “Public reaction
to the effects of early urban renewal programmes (which featured ‘slum clearance’ and
‘comprehensive redevelopment’) finally significantly changed the direction of thinking about
social mix, and is responsible in part for the present re-evaluation of the concept.” Id. at 241.
Id.
Id.
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to present itself as having removed impediments to economic opportunity
and “demonstrate that under its new welfare economy, the . . . [US]
government [would] now be employed to secure a decent family life in
neighborhoods which afford equal access to all, regardless of race, creed or
color.”83
On its face, aspiring to social mixing is fair and egalitarian in a plural
society. It seems sensible, if not important, that people be accustomed to
people from all walks of life. Yet, beneath the surface, social mixing presents
some discomfiting realities, including that in the past, mixing happened based
on the needs of the affluent, and the arrangements retained strict
demarcations of status distinctions and social control. There was a time when
social mixing in living arrangements was more prevalent. Yet, such mixing in
living arrangements was based on necessity and the reciprocal needs of the
wealthy and those who served them. In the mixed arrangements of the
seventeenth century, for example, before the advent of elevators, the poor, in
some European cities lived at the top of multistory apartments with the
wealthier living in ground floor apartments.84 Because the lower classes often
provided services to the wealthy, having them close by was essential.
Similarly, until the early twentieth century in the United States, the servant
and artisan classes lived in close proximity to the wealthy, making a form of
mixing the default rather than the exception. Housing in New Orleans and
Washington DC for the wealthy and white, for example, was accompanied by
a form of mixed housing scheme—lesser alley dwellings where the poorer,
often black, servants lived, again, to service the needs of the wealthy.85 With
improvements in technology and transportation, the need for proximity steadily
decreased while a desire for social status differentiation increased.
B.

Mixing and Race: Segregation as a Quest for Social Dominance

The desire for social status differentiation in the United States has
manifested itself through a pursuit by white people of social separation via
racial residential segregation. Mixed-income housing policy only makes
sense by taking this context into account. Racial residential segregation has
been deliberately and persistently constructed and fiercely maintained by

83.
84.
85.

Id. at 239.
Id.
SABIYHA PRINCE, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND GENTRIFICATION IN WASHINGTON, D.C.: RACE,
CLASS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL 43 (2014).
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public and private actors.86 The persistence of the pursuit of residential
segregation is important to consider because we only vaguely understand
segregation as a pursuit of geographical differentiation and hierarchy; i.e. a
quest for social dominance.
Social dominance theory “attributes systemic racial inequality to
purposeful efforts by dominant classes to preserve their privileged status.”87
Under this theory, society organizes itself into groups, some of which are
dominant while others are subordinate.88 The dominant groups are advantaged
in status and access to resources, justifying such advantages through
“legitimizing myths.”89 The myths “can appear as racist or as race-neutral and still
accomplish the same goal of social domination.”90 Whites, as part of the
dominant group in the United States endorse and legitimize race-neutral
policies that disparately impact people of color to “preserve their dominant
racial status.”91 For example, inequalities in the ways criminal laws are
conceived, and enforced either selectively or harshly are a persistent
reflection and effective method of social dominance.92 Race has historically
been connected to which activities were defined as crimes and resulted in
today’s hierarchy of black subjugation and white supremacy where those with
a criminal record are locked into economic and social exile.93 Racial
segregation in housing reflects decisions made to legitimize exclusionary
housing choices and patterns that result in racialized social dominance. The
legitimizing myth in terms of race, geography and housing is that the poverty
of the inner cities and the racialized white wealth of the suburbs are due to
individual merit which some groups possess and others do not. Similarly,
gentrification is considered inevitable and unstoppable because the dominant

86.
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See, e.g., CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING
(1955); DAVID M. P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL
POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2007); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67.
Darren L. Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: Social
Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 53 (2015).
See also Erika K. Wilson, Why Diversity Fails: Social Dominance Theory and the
Entrenchment of Racial Inequality, 26 NAT. BLACK. L.J. 129, 147–50 (2017).
JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF SOCIAL
HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 31 (1999); see also Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 32.
SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 88, at 31–32, 45–48.
Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 47. See also SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 88, at 171–75.
Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 48. See also SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 88, at 45; Reva
B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts
and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 95 (2000).
See Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 32–33, 84. See also SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 88,
at 202, 205–06.
See Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 74–85.
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group have selected formerly reviled places as desirable. In terms of particular
locations and places, these choices, protected by law, naturalize and mask the
pursuit of and a need for social dominance that once one looks closely is
apparent as the heart of racial residential segregation.
The history of racial residential segregation constructed during the 20th
century can clearly be seen as being in pursuit of social domination. Arising
in response to newfound Black mobility at the end of legal slavery and the
demise of Reconstruction,94 Whites engaged in a succession of efforts to
contain, control, and isolate Blacks.95 In search of improving their economic
circumstances and safety from the regimes of terror in former slave states,
Blacks migrated both locally and nationally in search of work and freedom
from the violence and feudal fetters of the Jim Crow south.96 Whites perceived
this mobility as a problem, or even an upheaval. Each succeeding decade in
the 20th century witnessed the adoption of new and improved tools, both legal
and extralegal, public and private. These were accompanied by legitimizing
myths that justified controlling where Blacks, and to ensure Whites lived apart
from them. These tools of residential separation involved a series of trial and
error efforts that cumulatively implemented a desire by Whites to control
Black movement and live apart from Blacks, Asians, Jews, Mexicans,
immigrants or anyone stigmatized as being undesirable.97 This separation is
noteworthy because postslavery, Blacks and Whites often lived in much less
separated residential patterns than today with some Blacks and some Whites
living intermixed or in scattered micropockets of racial groupings, still
segregated but less so than today.98 And simultaneously even during those
94.

95.

96.
97.
98.

This effort was of course in tandem with efforts to promote racial segregation in all other
aspects of American life, employment, education, public accommodations. See, e.g.,
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (affirming strict racial separation and exclusion
in public accommodations), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 373–74 (N.J. 1982) (attributing
the concept of the proprietor’s “absolute right of exclusion” at places otherwise held open
to the public to the end of slavery).
Charles Abrams lamented: “The suburbs and the quest for status are shaping the
American personality of the future as the frontier once shaped the American personality
of the past . . . . American neighborhoods have turned into a breeding ground of bias,
fear and discrimination.” ABRAMS, supra note 86, at 140, 149. The fear was one of
inundation. For example, in interracial public and cooperative housing, quotas for the
number of Negroes appears to have been considered desirable. Id. at 311–12, 316.
See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010).
See text accompanying notes 96–112.
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 20 (1993). See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 22, 27
(describing existing racially mixed neighborhoods). New, finer-grained studies reveal
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relatively more integrated days, because of the separation that did exist, Blacks
were more easily economically exploited, as their options for living spaces
were kept artificially limited by segregation. They paid relatively high rents
for poor living accommodations.99
Though the racial residential segregation that we live with today seems
natural to some and inevitable to many, the literature makes it quite clear that
it did not happen by accident. Instead, the landscape we navigate daily was
deliberately constructed by multiple individual, institutional, and
governmental decisions and policies over the past 100 years. The residential
segregation that was constructed during the twentieth century continues to
this day and has resulted in a pattern of racial residential segregation across
the United States.
Social domination theory posits that efforts to maintain social
dominance, in this case segregation, take place simultaneously through
individual, institutional, and societal means. Segregation was created and
maintained through a variety of means that reflect an ever-shifting interplay
of private sentiments and public practices.100 It was a vast self-reinforcing
experiment of sorts—with the invalidation of one technique, another
technique replaced it. Sometimes there was government regulation, state
action, unofficial practices, or failure to regulate or provide redress. For
example, the Supreme Court’s invalidation of racial zoning in 1917 led to a
desperate search for other mechanisms to contain black mobility and fulfill
the continued pervasive desire for separation.101 Private land use agreements

racial mixing in neighborhoods as segregation doubled nationally from 1880 to 1940.
Trevon D. Logan & John M. Parman, The National Rise in Residential Segregation, 77 J.
ECON. HIST. 127, 129 (2017).
99. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008). But
see generally N.D.B. CONNOLLY, A WORLD MORE CONCRETE: REAL ESTATE AND THE
REMAKING OF JIM CROW SOUTH FLORIDA (2014).
100. See, e.g., Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 967,
967 (2012) (concluding that the Fair Housing Act’s nondiscrimination provisions cannot
combat white housing preferences for segregation).
101. See Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of
1910–1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 314–15 (1983) (discussing Baltimore’s decision to closely
follow the Chicago Plan for racial segregation: “The plan was ‘to forc[e] out the blacks
already residing in [white] neighborhoods and [to ensure] that no others entered.’”);
Garrett Power, Meade v. Dennistone: The NAACP's Test Case to " . . . Sue Jim Crow Out
of Maryland with the Fourteenth Amendment", 63 MD. L. REV. 773, 792 (2004) (“The
Committee on Segregation undertook to encourage neighbors, government officials, and
real estate agents to use restrictive covenants, peer pressure, harassment, and suasion to
promote de facto segregation.”).
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and racially restrictive covenants became the next technique of choice.102
While enforcement of such covenants was proscribed in 1948,103 private
decisions to racially discriminate went unchecked until the 1968 Fair Housing
Act.104 At the same time, federal practices enshrined racial segregation in
suburban living patterns through federal financing guarantees. Redlining based
lending risk assessments on negative racial perceptions assuming black
occupancy in a neighborhood meant it was in decline or of low value.105
Racially homogeneous white neighborhoods were deemed a sure bet for stable
lending. Regardless of income, mortgage loans were overwhelmingly
unavailable to Blacks.106 Segregation was also enforced by violence, which was
especially prevelant when black families tried to move into white
neighborhoods.107 Tacit agreements among owners and realtors also allowed
the ghetto to easily capture Blacks as they sought to move.108
Also, the federal government consistently conditioned building projects
on maintaining strict racial separation or exclusion of Blacks under the
rationale that it was adopting the prevailing practices but often it was
introducing racially segregatory practices.109 Similarly, eminent domain and

102. See Power, Meade v. Dennistone, supra note 101, at 792. (detailing the collaboration
between the city agencies, real estate professionals and white homeowners associations
to racially segregate black homeowners).
103. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
104. For example, the infamous Levittown development was racially restricted based on what
was considered to be a market imperative of prevailing hostility to Black neighbors. See
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 266. (“‘As a Jew, I have no room in my mind or heart for
racial prejudice,” [Levittown builder William Levitt] said. “But I have come to know that
if we sell one house to a Negro family, then 90 or 95 percent of our white customers will
not buy into the community. This is their attitude, not ours. As a company, our position
is simply this: We can solve a housing problem, or we can try to solve a racial problem,
but we cannot combine the two.’”).
105. See FREUND, supra note 86, at 113–14; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 64–82, 86; JACKSON
infra note 195, 199–200 (2017).
106. See generally BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE
EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA (2009).
107. In the Midwest and the South, for example, sundown towns rigidly enforced a tacit threat
that black people had to be out of town by sundown. JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN
TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM, 90–115 (2005) (describing the
variety of methods for excluding black people from towns across America through
violence, ordinance or informal law enforcement actions. The term “sundown” refers to
the understanding that black people had to conclude their business in a town and get out
by the end of the day).
108. See ANTERO PIETILA, NOT IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD: HOW BIGOTRY SHAPED A GREAT
AMERICAN CITY 56–60 (2010).
109. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 21. During the Depression era, federal housing projects
followed “a ‘neighborhood composition rule’: federal housing projects should reflect the
previous racial composition of their neighborhoods. Projects in white areas could house
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redevelopment disproportionately targeted black neighborhoods.110 And
through it all, municipal regulatory power was exercised via zoning—styled as
neutral, implemented according to an exclusionary world view, but ultimately a
pillar of residential racial segregation. Zoning ordinances emerged as a
revolutionary modern tool of regulation that applied race and class reasoning
and aspirations to a still nascent suburban ideal to restrict land use by building
type. Such ordinances assumed an inherent incompatibility between the
single-family home and the multifamily building. When the Supreme Court
ratified zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,111 it enshrined
economic segregation and exclusion as a constitutional, if not sensible,
exercise of the police power. One’s housing type and size were understood as
a function of buying power and, tacitly, of economic station. Exclusionary
zoning thus became a central tool in the localist toolkit for hoarding resources
for the members of relatively affluent local government units.112

only white tenants, those in African American areas could house only African American
tenants, and only projects in already-integrated neighborhoods could house both whites
and blacks.” Id.
110. See Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 428 (D. Md.
2005) (describing an example of segregatory practices in relation to Baltimore’s public
housing); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 32, 191–92 (use of redevelopment to demolish
black neighborhoods usually forcing black residents into other segregated
neighborhoods.). See also James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historical and
Legal Analysis of Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22
HOW. L.J. 547, 588–90 (1979) (noting that the Great Society programs with geographic
emphasis and geographic eligibility requirements, like Model Cities and Community
Action Programs, generally perceived as benign or beneficial, worsened segregation and
movement to the suburbs); Colin Marshall, Pruitt-Igoe: The Troubled High-Rise That
Came to Define Urban America, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2015, 7:52 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/apr/22/pruitt-igoe-high-rise-urban-americahistory-cities [https://perma.cc/D6XL-AEYQ] (infamous public housing project
demolished in the 1970s that has come to symbolize the failures of public housing
divorced from place, economic feasibility and the needs of its residents).
111. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
112. See RICHARD REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS IS
LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT
IT (2017); Steve Inskeep, Top 20% of Americans ‘Hoard the American Dream’, NPR:
MORNING EDITION (May 31, 2017, 5:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/05/31
/530843665/top-20-percent-of-americans-hoard-the-american-dream
[https://perma.cc/QC3U-9KRB] (“Reeves argues that the top 20 percent of
Americans . . . dominate the best schools, live in the best-located homes and pass on the
best futures to their kids. . . . ‘[W]e protect our neighborhoods, we hoard housing
wealth, we also monopolize selective higher education and then we hand out internships
and work opportunities on the basis of the social network—people we know in the
neighborhood or meet on the tennis courts. As so to that extent we are kind of hoarding
those things that should be more widely available.’”).
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For much of the twentieth century, the racially-disparate negative effects
of zoning were rarely acknowledged, and were legitimated as natural and
inevitable.113 One consequence has been that zoning has enshrined a
stigmatization of lower cost multifamily housing, in particular rental
apartments—it allows owners of relatively higher priced single family housing
to exclude multifamily housing structures from zones designated single
family.114 For over 90 years, zoning as a tool of community design has allowed
choices that assumed the most desirable way to live was cloistered from
commerce, lower cost housing, strangers, and foot traffic.115 An overlooked
consequence of the ubiquity of this assumption is that but for zoning, an
individual homeowner’s or neighborhood’s ability to exclude low cost
housing would not exist.116 This history of deliberate, consistent, and

113. See Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S.
365 (1926) (“[N]o gift of second sight is required to foresee that if [racial zoning] had
been sustained [in Buchanan], its provisions would have spread from city to city
throughout the length and breadth of the land. And it is equally apparent that the next
step in the exercise of this police power would be to apply similar restrictions for the
purpose of segregating in like manner various groups of newly arrived immigrants. The
blighting of property values and the congesting of population, whenever the colored
races or certain foreign races invade a residential section, are so well known as to be
within judicial cognizance.”).
114. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (“[I]n . . . [single family or
detached houses] sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed
in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the
residential character of the district . . . .their height and bulk [interfering]with the free
circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun . . . and bringing, as their
necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and
business . . . detracting from their safety and depriving children of the privilege of quiet
and open spaces for play, . . . until, finally, the residential character of the neighborhood
and its desirability as a place of detached residences are utterly destroyed. Under these
circumstances, apartment houses . . . come very near to being nuisances.”).
115. Though studies seldom demonstrate a negative impact on housing prices from the
construction of well-managed and appropriately scaled apartments, the conventional
wisdom that multifamily housing hurts property values is accepted unquestioningly as
fact. See Mai Thi Nguyen et al., Opposition to Affordable Housing in the USA: Debate
Framing and the Responses of Local Actors, 30 HOUSING THEORY & SOC’Y 107, 111 (2013)
(discussing the stigmatization of affordable housing as tied to race and attributed to,
among other things, fears of declines in property values); J. Rosie Tighe, Public Opinion
and Affordable Housing: A Review of the Literature, 25 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 3, 9–10 (2010)
(noting the numerous efforts to study assumed negative effects of affordable housing on
property values and finding little evidence of such effect from well-managed
developments).
116. GUY STUART, DISCRIMINATING RISK, THE U.S. MORTGAGE LENDING INDUSTRY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 37 (2003) (observing that, absent zoning, high land values are inadequate
for excluding lower-income residents from a neighborhood because housing can be made
affordable by owners building and renting out apartments). The effect of lower cost housing
located near higher cost housing could be nearly eliminated because no neighborhood
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institutional racial segregation has led to effects that are devastating in two
overlooked respects—segregation has 1) shaped the lack of affordable housing
in the United States and 2) been exacerbated by unstable, market-based
approaches to the provision of lower-income housing.117
C.

Mixing and Class: The Opposition to Low-Income Housing

The notion that poor people bring something undesirable to a
neighborhood has been widespread and persistent in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries. This belief manifests in persistent opposition to the
building of low-income housing in single family residential home
neighborhoods.118 This opposition is largely seen as a rational response to the
investment in one’s home resulting in an attendant investment in racialized
property values enhanced by race and class exclusion.119 Social domination
theory is helpful for understanding this class opposition as a pursuit of status
and dominance, as well as the reciprocal relationship between dominant and
subordinate status. Thus, the flip side of the resulting black spatial isolation
is status protection. White residential homogeneity has benefitted Whites
financially and psychically by providing a highly valued form of culturally
transmitted capital. Not only does segregation relate to such status, but it
allows Whites to feel safe from fear of Blacks. The fear is rationally
irrational—the safety provided by segregation is so highly valued that it is
reflected in the prices that buyers are willing to pay for neighborhoods that

would be immune and builders who might find it financially attractive to build such
housing could do so. Low cost housing would theoretically be dispersed in diverse places.
The ability to run would not exist and thus the need to accept it would be increased.
117. See generally JASON HACKWORTH, THE NEOLIBERAL CITY: GOVERNANCE, IDEOLOGY, AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN URBANISM 48–60 (2006) (describing the influence of
neoliberalism in the move towards privatization in the provision of public housing as
exemplified by the HOPE VI program).
118. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 44–49 (2013)
(providing an example of the typical political opposition to an affordable housing
development in Mount Laurel, New Jersey); JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVEIN VIOLENCE AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 158–
59 (2012) (describing the opposition to affordable housing in Chicago in the context of
Gautreaux litigation settlement); CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN
AMERICA SINCE 1960: PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 235–36 (2005) (noting the
reality of opposition to low-income family housing in Nassau County, Long Island as
perceived as being occupied by African Americans).
119. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001).
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are homogeneous.120 It has also enabled the white hoarding of segregation’s
benefits, with resources withdrawn in various ways from black areas.121 As
discussed above, generic rules of zoning allow those resources in terms of
lower taxes from higher property values and with greater resources for
services like schools, to be retained for current and future generations.122 As
a result of the successful opposition to low-income housing, the segregated
metropolitan landscape is comprised of a spatial and societal dynamic of stigma,
shame, valorization, and self-satisfaction. The stark contrast in neighborhood
circumstances also provides an unacknowledged benefit—the pleasure of the
contrast, a reciprocal relationship between disinvestment and valorization.
The worse one area is, the more valuable other areas will be. This benefit is
racialized—it is available to Whites even if they are lower income.123
The cost is a belief that this engineered situation is natural, and that to
reverse it requires social engineering. This fuels a racialized withdrawal from the
provision of public goods, or seeing the need for them, because they are

120. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 150 (2d ed., 2006) (“In general, homes of similar
design, size, and appearance cost more in white communities than in black or integrated
communities. Their value also rises more quickly and steeply in white communities. In
theory, then, whites pay a premium to live in homogeneous neighborhoods, but their
property appreciates at an enhanced rate.”). See also LEEANN LANDS, THE CULTURE OF
PROPERTY: RACE, CLASS, AND HOUSING LANDSCAPES IN ATLANTA, 1880–1950 93 (2009)
(noting an early opponent to racial integration argued “[t]here is no problem so grave,
nor one so fraught with so much danger to property values as the gradual influx of the
negro into blocks or squares where none but whites reside”); WILKERSON, supra note 96,
at 376 (“It was an article of faith among many people in Chicago and other big cities that
the arrival of colored people in an all-white neighborhood automatically lowered
property values.”).
121. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION
SYSTEM 19 (2007) (“If out-group members are spatially segregated from in-group
members, then the latter are put in a good position to use their social power to create
institutions and practices that channel resources away from the places where out-group
members live . . . . Spatial segregation renders stratification easy, convenient, and
efficient because simply by investing or disinvesting in a place, one can invest or disinvest
in a whole set of people.”).
122. See REEVES, supra note 112, at 104–05 (describing the manifestation of exclusionary
zoning today).
123. While the white lower-income person generally does not reside in neighborhoods of
concentrated poverty and instead resides in economically integrated neighborhoods,
overall income inequality is increasing economic segregation as the advantaged segregate
themselves. See generally FLORIDA & MELLANDER, supra note 66 (“The wealthy are more
segregated than the poor—indeed they are the most segregated of all, and by a considerable
margin . . . . About half of all black families have lived in the poorest American
neighborhoods over the last two generations, compared to just 7 percent of white
families.”).
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perceived to be benefiting an undeserving, illegitimate other—Blacks.124 The
opposition to low-income housing has been, and is still, a significant
impediment to racial integration and the building of affordable housing
outside of the inner cities. It is the reason why racial segregation continues to
be a battleground fifty years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act.125
1.

Federal Withdrawal From Support for Affordable Housing
Has Led to Market-Based Approaches

The negative attitude towards public or social housing in the United
States has been shaped by a sense of failure of surrounding public housing
developments accompanied by a longstanding ideologically driven belief that
somehow the private market can do a better job than the government.126
Public housing began almost as an aberration following the Great Depression
to address the housing needs of a temporarily submerged middle class and
then became a program of last resort, housing for the poorest of the poor.127
With the growing lack of support for social housing, the federal government
has steadily withdrawn direct financial support for construction and subsidies
and tended towards relying on private markets and actors—the most dramatic
illustrations of this approach are the Section 8 housing voucher program and the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) programs.128 Accompanying this
development has been the rise of the mixed-income principle, whose
124. While the homogeneity has benefited white residents financially, it has arguably deprived
white people living in homogenously white areas of access to and ability to cope with
difference. Martha Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 599, 640 (2008) (“A 2006 review of 500 prior studies, involving
more than 250,000 participants, found that greater levels of intergroup contact among
children, adolescents, and adults are associated with lower levels of intergroup
prejudice.”). But J. Eric Oliver notes that the higher the minority population at the
metropolitan level, the higher levels of racial prejudice. J. ERIC OLIVER, THE PARADOXES
OF INTEGRATION: RACE, NEIGHBORHOOD, AND CIVIC LIFE IN MULTIETHNIC AMERICA 8
(2010).
125. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2507 (2015) (holding that disparate-impact liability was available under the Fair
Housing Act); Cty. of Westchester v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 116 F. Supp. 3d
251, 261 (S.D.N.Y 2015), aff’d, 802 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2015) (dismissing County’s
challenge to earlier ruling that False Claims Act had been violated when County falsely
certified it had analyzed race-based impediments to fair housing).
126. See LAWRENCE J. VALE, PURGING THE POOREST: PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE DESIGN POLITICS
OF TWICE-CLEARED COMMUNITIES (2013).
127. See Jason Hackworth, Destroyed by Hope: Public Housing, Neoliberalism and Progressive
Housing Activism in the US, in WHERE THE OTHER HALF LIVES: LOWER INCOME HOUSING
IN A NEOLIBERAL WORLD 236 (Sarah Glynn ed., 2009).
128. See id. at 241.
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popularity has grown steadily as a way to avoid the past failures of public
housing and hopefully ensure healthy sustainable integrated developments.129
The extensive public housing redevelopment program, HOPE VI, was the first
widespread effort to adopt the mixed-income and mixed-tenure principle.130
The program was highly controversial because it tore down existing public
housing to construct mixed-income, mixed-tenure replacement housing
developments that never contained sufficient units to house all of the original
residents.131 Displaced residents were often given Section 8 vouchers and were
forced to resettle in surrounding high-poverty, segregated neighborhoods.132
This history is crucial for understanding how mixed-income housing has
become so popular. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) began to endorse mixed-income housing as the desirable way to build
social housing and foster integration.133 While not widely understood as a
racial integration strategy, the tacit assumption has been that indirectly,
economic integration would achieve all of the same things that a racial
integration strategy would. Since Blacks are overrepresented in low-income
groups, the unspoken assumption is that Blacks will likely be included in the
target beneficiary group in many metropolitan areas. This is beneficial since,
as this paper argues, economic integration is more socially and politically

129. See Glynn, supra note 72, at 78 (“[T]he push for income mix today has coincided with a
retreat towards past levels of inequality as governments abandon the idea that equality is
possible, or even desirable. Income mix has become a substitute for income
equality. . . . The current incarnation of the idea of income mix is based around the
argument for area effects—that is, that it is worse to be poor in a poor area than poor in
an area of mixed prosperity. This is an idea that developed in the United States and has
become generally accepted, acquiring the status of a common-sense truth. However, it
was based more on intuition than evidence.”).
130. See Richard D. Baron, The Evolution of Hope VI as a Development Program, in FROM
DESPAIR TO HOPE: HOPE VI AND THE NEW PROMISE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA’S
CITIES 31, 31–33 (Henry G. Cisneros & Lora Engdahl eds., 2009); Henry G. Cisneros, A
New Moment for People and Cities, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE: HOPE VI AND THE NEW
PROMISE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA’S CITIES, supra, at 9–12; Bruce Katz, The Origins
of Hope VI, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE: HOPE VI AND THE NEW PROMISE OF PUBLIC
HOUSING IN AMERICA’S CITIES, supra, at 21.
131. See generally WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE?: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING
COMMUNITIES (Larry Bennett, Janet L. Smith, & Patricia A. Wright eds., 2006) (describing
Chicago and other cities efforts to build mixed-income housing through the HOPE VI
program).
132. See Thompson v. Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., 404 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding HUD
failed to affirmatively further fair housing when it allowed public housing authorities to
follow historic intentionally racial discriminatory patterns of public housing siting).
133. See Bruce Katz, supra note 130, at 27.
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palatable since racial hostility is still a feature of the American landscape.134
Yet whether mixed-income housing represents an advancement or
retrenchment is still an unanswered question. As Edward Goetz observes:
“We find ourselves now at the end of the era of public housing, as
those same facilities, now aged, neglected, and sometimes severely
distressed, are taken down and replaced by another new planners’
utopia, the mixed-income, New Urbanist community. This
circularity is notable in itself . . . .”135

The downside of the economic integration approach is the extent to
which market considerations fail to meet the needs of those in most need of
housing support. As the following discussion will demonstrate, the market
does not favor low-income people. Racial stigma and hostility over status
threat are ever present. Providing a public good like mixed-income housing
through private means requires program administration that maximizes
private market value with the minimum of public subsidy. In the housing
context, this reality has been exacerbated by the steadily declining financial
support for subsidized rental housing.
D.

Mixing and the Consequences of Segregation

The legacy of twentieth century segregation and present-day segregative
behaviors is widespread white-black spatial isolation and social separation. While
mixing is the current social goal, our metropolitan regions are divided into
dual housing markets that result in concentrations of black disadvantage and
white advantage. Black people were excluded from the initial wave of
suburbanization and were overwhelmingly cut off from access to asset
building through house value appreciation. They were instead relegated to
crowded, expensive areas with depressed markets.136 The consequence and
challenge for mixing is that wherever Blacks are they are concentrated in

134. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 100, at 1015 (“Inclusionary zoning policies are not silver
bullets for inclusion in that urban poor households do not always benefit from these policies.”);
see generally Drew Volmert et. al., Mixing It Up: Reframing Neighborhood Socioeconomic
Diversity 44–48 (2016) (for a helpful exposition of the need for economic integration while
secondarily acknowledging racial integration and Fair Housing as a necessary component),
http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/pubs/mm/mixingitup/Knight_MessageMemo_Final_2
016.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5P7-EB4R].
135. Edward G. Goetz, Book Review: Purging the Poorest: Public Housing and the Design
Politics of Twice-Cleared Communities, 44 CONTEMP. SOC., 128 (2015) (reviewing VALE,
supra note 126) https://journals.sagepub.com /doi/full/10.1177/0094306114562201ddd
[https://perma.cc/5JYW-CCHD].
136. See generally FREUND, supra note 86.
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certain identifiable areas of town.137 This phenomenon of segregation can be
measured by a “dissimilarity index,” which indexes metropolitan areas based
on the percentage of Whites that would have to move to achieve statistical
integration.138 Thus an index of 65 means 65 percent of Blacks would have to
move to achieve eliminate segregation. All of the dissimilarity indices show
increasing rates of black-white segregation through the twentieth century.139
As Massey and Denton found, “[b]efore 1940, no racial or ethnic
group . . . had ever experienced an isolation index above 60 percent,” but
between 1940 and 1970 Blacks and Whites occupied wholly distinct
neighborhoods.140 As discussed above, this was a dramatic departure from
nineteenth century residential housing patterns “where neighborhoods were
racially integrated and the social worlds of blacks and whites overlapped.”141
The depressive impact on wealth accumulation and intergenerational wealth
transmission serves as a profound intergenerational transmission of inequality.142

137. The scientific measures fail to capture the lived experiences of racial separation and
homogeneity. That lived experience has to take into account both the pain and pleasure
of the resulting racial segregation. On the one hand, racial segregation has provided a
certain predictability to our metropolitan areas. It denotes for many places to be avoided
and places to desire. For example, academics and journalists have documented that the
vast majority of MLK Blvds in the United States ran through areas with Black residents.
See Tanvi Misra, The Remaking of Martin Luther King Streets, CITYLAB (Nov. 23, 2015),
https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2015/11/the-remaking-of-martin-luther-kingstreets/415449 [https://perma.cc/X5WN-6B4T].
138. See generally RICHARD H. SANDER, YANA A. KUCHEVA & JONATHAN M. ZASLOFF, MOVING
TOWARD INTEGRATION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING passim (2018)
(describing changes in the dissimilarity index over time as part of a comprehensive
review of the policies giving rise to segregation and arguments for steps to take to
promote integration).
139. See generally MARK FOSSETT, NEW METHODS FOR MEASURING AND ANALYZING
SEGREGATION (2017). The persistent extreme segregation for black people in high
poverty black neighborhoods that existed in the 1960s or 1970s are the same high poverty
neighborhoods that exist today. But see Alan Berube, Beyond Baltimore: Thoughts on
Place,
Race,
and
Opportunity,
BROOKINGS
(Sept.
29,
2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/beyond-baltimore-thoughts-on-place-raceand-opportunity [https://perma.cc /X5WN-6B4T] (noting that Baltimore has below
average concentration of poverty); Keith Aoki, Direct Democracy, Racial Group Agency,
Local Government Law, and Residential Racial Segregation: Some Reflections on Radical
and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 185, 195 (1997); (“[G]iven the same economic
ability, Asians preferred to live in Asian and Anglo neighborhoods, while avoiding
African-American communities.”).
140. Douglas S. Massey, Origins of Economic Disparities: The Historical Role of Housing
Segregation, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 39, 66, 75 (James H. Carr
& Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008).
141. Id. at 75.
142. See, e.g., MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 130–38, 148–68 (2d ed. 2006).
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Racial segregation is still, however, perceived to be merely the natural
separation of the races with the causes of that separation poorly understood.143
The first way that segregation should be understood is as not merely
separation, but as a disinvestment by the majority society. That disinvestment
happens on two levels. First, disinvestment means that those with resources
leave or avoid neighborhoods that are primarily Black or such neighborhoods
become so after White flight. Second, the neighborhoods are commercially
abandoned—national retail and commercial enterprises bypass these
communities, leading to food deserts, and a lack of banking and retail options.
The consequence of both is that the housing markets suffer—to the extent there is
homeownership, there will be lower property values for comparable housing.144
Second, segregation should be understood as causing a concentration of
impoverished Black people in racially segregated neighborhoods. This
phenomenon is seen as one of personal choice, cultural behaviors, and lack of
striving—a bad place is widely believed to reflect bad people. Yet, sociologists
have proven that racial segregation causes concentrations of poverty.145 First,
the trend towards racial segregation coincided with deindustrialization and
the loss of manufacturing industries. The resulting unemployment
concentrates the people most affected into inner city communities. As noted
by William Julius Wilson, the poverty numbers and stigma are a geographical
manifestation of these economic trends.146 For lower-income Blacks, these
neighborhoods are characterized by low property values, high dilapidation,
commercial underinvestment, criminogenic living experiences, and
paradoxically high public investments focused on policing, incarceration, and

143. See Volmert et. al., supra note 134, at 4.
144. See Rafael Mota, The Power of an Illusion: How the Racial Wealth Gap was Created,
YouTube (Sep. 13. 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHo8AKNfB68
(discussing the property values of his childhood home as compared to identical
structures in white suburban neighborhoods).
145. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 98, at 115–47 (segregation leads to
geographical stratification of affluence and poverty that tracks race); GARY ORFIELD,
CHUNGMEI LEE, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY
(2005) (segregation creates high poverty schools); MARY PATTILLO, BLACK PICKET FENCES:
PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS, (2d ed. 2013); JOHN R. LOGAN,
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS, AND ASIANS
IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2011); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013). But see
Lincoln Quillian, Segregation as a Source of Contextual Advantage: A Formal Theory with
Application to American Cities, 3 RSF: RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 152 (2017)
(arguing that income is very important to understanding how segregation or
desegregation affects racialized concentrations of poverty and affluence).
146. WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1997).
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the services necessary to address the social consequences of such incarceration
(referred to as “million dollar blocks”).147 According to Mary Patillo, for
upper-income Blacks, their neighborhoods often adjoin these lower-income
black neighborhoods. They experience lower property values, and the
spillover effects of the concentrated poverty on their neighborhoods.148 Thus,
the Black middle-class experience comes with a somewhat paradoxical
deprivation—the paradoxical decreased ability to as effectively exclude lowerincome housing experienced by white middle-class neighborhood
residents.149 Mixing could theoretically ameliorate these consequences.
E.

Mixing and Attaining Integration

1.

Defining Integration

Mixing is a principle and method designed to accomplish the goal of
integration. Because of the difficulty in coming up with an operational
definition of integration, it is challenging to develop consistent, principled
standards for mixing. The question is rarely asked is how much mixing is
required to count as mixing. Instead, the principle or method threatens to
become the goal itself, rather than serving as a means to a desired end. The
assumption is that the mixing principle is the same as the goal of integration.
This is similar to the diversity principle in affirmative action litigation, where
the method or technique of diversity to accomplish integration has become
an end in itself, diversity is now the goal rather than a means to a desired
147. See James Austin et al., Sentencing Project, Ending Mass Incarceration: Charting A New
Justice Reinvestment 5 (2013). (“The most locally concentrated pockets of incarceration
were dubbed “Million Dollar Blocks,” because of the millions being spent each year on
prison cells for high proportions of working-age male residents for an average of three
years. Million dollar blocks dramatized the tradeoffs for specific neighborhoods between
locally concentrated incarceration spending policies, and alternative, locally focused investment
policies that could yield greater returns in public safety, strengthened community institutions,
and expanded neighborhood networks.”); Jennifer Gonnerman, Million-Dollar Blocks: The
Neighborhood Costs of America’s Prison Boom, VILLAGE VOICE (2004),
http://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking2/Millions.html [https://perma.cc
/3FK56HKP] (reprinted in TARA HERIVEL& PAUL WRIGHT, PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES
MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION (2009)); Geoge C. Galster, Jackie M. Cutsinger & Ron
Malega, The Costs of Concentrated Poverty: Neighborhood Property Markets and the
Dynamics of Decline, in REVISITING RENTAL HOUSING: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND
PRIORITIES 93, 94–96 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008).
148. PATILLO, supra note 145, at 30, 87. See also Bart Landry & Kris Marsh, The Evolution of
the New Black Middle Class, 37 ANN. REV. SOC. 373 (2011) (discussing black middle class
and racial residential segregation).
149. See Patrick Sharkey, Spatial Segmentation and the Black Middle Class, 119 AM. J. SOC. 903
(2014); McFarlane, supra note 65.
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policy end.150 Mixing likewise becomes an end that leads to failure to identify
standards for how or why it should be accomplished.
There is a tendency to be vague about mixing because defining
integration is hard. The literal definition of integration is “[t]he process of
making whole or combining into one.” 151 It is estimated that attaining perfect
residential integration, according to the dissimilarity index, would require all
Blacks to move based on the segregation index in the metropolitan region.152 This
clinical definition of integration raises the question of whether, and why, we
want to achieve this.153 The unstated assumptions are that there are no
appreciable differences between Blacks and Whites and that community
among black people is undesirable and unnecessary.154 The National Research
Council definition suggests an alternate, more fully developed definition of
integration:
Complete integration exists in a multiracial institution if: (1) there
is significant numerical representation for each group; (2) each
group is distributed throughout the institutional structure; and (3)
each group enjoys equality, authority, and power within the
institution. These conditions will not develop . . . unless equal
status of the races is achieved, common superordinate goals exist
for all, and the process has authoritative sanction and support.155

150. See Lesley A. Jacobs, Integration, Diversity, and Affirmative Action, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
725, 728 (1998) (arguing for pursuing both an integration rationale and the diversity
rationale for affirmative action).
151. See Integration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
152. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 98, at 20 (“The standard measure of segregation is the
index of dissimilarity, which captures the degree to which blacks and whites are evenly
spread among neighborhoods in a city . . . The index of dissimilarity gives the
percentage of blacks who would have to move to achieve an ‘even’ residential pattern—
one where every neighborhood replicates the racial composition of the city.”).
153. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION (2013).
154. John O. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-theFuture Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1497 n.46 (1993) (“Although blacks and whites share
consensus on an abstract goal of achieving an integrated and equalitarian society, ‘their
images of what constitute integrated, equalitarian, and racially harmonious conditions
are often different or contradictory . . . and [their] perceptions of the genesis and
reproduction of group inequality are sharply divergent.’”).
155. GERALD DAVID JAYNES, ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., EDS., A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1989), supra note 154, at 57 (italics added). See Minow, supra note
124, at 600; 602 (“As Dr. King described it, integration involves the creation of a
community of relationships among people who view one another as valuable, who take
pride in one another’s contributions, and who appreciate differences and know that
commonalities and synergies outweigh any extra efforts that bridging differences may require.
… In integrated communities, people’s differences become a resource, opening avenues for
learning, exchange, self-invention, and self-extension through connections,

Discrimination Management

1177

Yet, none of the theoretical definitions acknowledge the tension caused
by an ongoing white preference for segregation that exists in tandem with
integration efforts.156 The definition of integration that underlies many such
policy efforts relies heavily on the elusive elements of social acceptance, and
probably explain why we have not yet achieved it meaningfully.157 If, as
discussed above, white space is highly valued as a hoarded resource,158
integration means something far more radical than merely desegregating—it
means accepting Blacks, possibly in substantial numbers, into areas that are
cherished for being exclusively white areas. Integration has been problematic due
to these inherent group inequality and power differentials that are attendant
to America’s history of racial segregation. Yet, focusing integration efforts
more directly on disrupting the group inequality and power differentials is
potentially politically fraught. In this challenging context, integration’s first
goal is to establish a norm of mixing as nonsegregation and then see that the
principle is followed in community planning and design. Second, it has to
define what that mixing should look like in ways that fulfill antidiscrimination
principles. Third, from an efficacy standpoint, it has to face entrenched
attachment to both segregation and discrimination, as well as the financial
and political ability to circumvent. In particular, this challenge is
compounded by the effects of segregation, namely that non-middle-class
Black integration remains the primary battleground.
2.

The Fair Housing Act as the Prevailing Legal Norm for Integration

Desegregation and integration legislation faced a daunting challenge of
ending a destructive practice that the majority perceived to be tangibly
beneficial. Law makers sought to do so in a manner that would not offend or
upset that majority who felt a perceived property right to discriminate based
on race was being circumscribed. The formal adoption of antidiscrimination

disagreements, and identifications with people sharing multiple lines of similarity and
difference.”).
156. See Cara Wong, Would We Know ‘Integration If We Were to See It?’ Measurement and
the Imperative of Integration, 12 POL. STUD. REV. 353 (2014) (summarizing the
quantitative challenges of defining and measuring integration).
157. Rodney A. Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas, and Goals in the
1980’s, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 947 (1985) (arguing that racial integration been essentially
written out of U.S. Supreme Court doctrine).
158. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1746 (1993)
(“After the dismantling of legalized race segregation, whiteness took on the character of
property in the modern sense in that relative white privilege was legitimated as the status
quo.”).
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principles with respect to housing began with the 1968 federal Fair Housing
Act (FHA).159 The legislation’s sponsors saw the contradiction of American
ideals of liberty and mobility by allowing the exclusion of Blacks with financial
resources as one of the most blatant manifestations of the harms of rampant
discrimination. Since then, the legislation has been understood as using the
prohibition on discrimination to attain integration as a complementary
goal.160 The necessary first step to implementing integration was to remove
artificial barriers to geographic mobility that restricted racial minorities of
economic means from moving out of ghetto areas.
Reflecting the realpolitik of the era, desegregation was couched in the
language of discrimination based on racial identity, as well as other prohibited
identity categories, but was in fact class-based in terms of who would be able
to take advantage of its’ provisions—mainly affluent and upper middle-class
black homeowners aspiring to purchase or rent in white neighborhoods that
were formerly off limits. When the Act prohibited exclusion of individuals
seeking to rent or purchase housing, the drafters knew and, in search of votes,
explicitly assured legislators that very few Blacks would be able to take
advantage of the Act’s protections because relatively few would have the
resources to purchase housing.161 Black exit was always assumed to be to the
suburbs, where the jobs were located but, simultaneously understood to be
economically unobtainable locations. The legislation’s promise was mobility
159. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2015). At the height of agitation for “open
housing,” the Supreme Court revived the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in Jones v. Mayer
making available the statute’s broad antidiscrimination principles with respect to
property ownership. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
160. See Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2521–22, 2525–26 (2015) (recognizing the FHA’s goal was to achieve integrated
communities by, among other things, eliminating barriers from zoning); see Robert G.
Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 709, 715 (2017) (“[E]arly Supreme Court and lower-court decisions
[recognized] the statute should be interpreted broadly to achieve its goal of
integration.”).
161. 114 CONG. REC. 2279 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke) (“Fair housing does not promise
to end the ghetto; it promises only to demonstrate that the ghetto is not an immutable
institution in America. It will scarcely lead to a mass dispersal of the ghetto population
to the suburbs; but it will make it possible for those who have the resources to escape the
stranglehold now suffocating the inner cities of America.”); 114 CONG. REC. 2525 (1968)
(statement of Sen. Brooke) (“This measure, as we have said so often before, will not tear
down the ghetto. It will merely unlock the door for those who are able and choose to
leave. I cannot imagine a step so modest, yet so significant, as the proposal now before
the Senate.”); 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (“[T]he basic
purpose of the legislation is to permit people who have the ability to do so to buy any
house offered to the public if they can afford to buy it. It would not overcome the
economic problem of those who could not afford to purchase the house of their choice.”).
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for those in the ghetto who had the financial means and the emotional
stamina to experience hostility to their arrival. The FHA promoted a version
of integration informed by stark principles of individualism,162 limiting the
scope and reach of its integrative potential, and thus making it palatable for
adoption.
The proponents intended to address the income gap in ability to
purchase housing through companion federal legislation that made funds
available for homeownership. This legislation also intended for low- and
moderate-income housing to be built outside of “the ghetto” in the suburbs.163
This income gap illustrates that attaining integration, being able to live
outside of black ghetto areas in cities and in white areas in the suburbs, closer
to jobs, had two dimensions: 1) integration for Blacks with financial means
to be mobile and move where desired; and 2) integration for Blacks without
financial means, who needed financial support to acquire or rent homes, as
well as, new homes built outside of inner city areas. It is this second aspect of
the integration challenge that continues today—the need for lower income,
non-middle-class integration. The federal government has struggled ever
since to find a way to make white communities to accept racial integration, in
general, and specifically integration of non-wealthy Blacks.164

162. EDWARD WILLIAM BROOKE, THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE: CRISIS IN OUR TWO-PARTY
SYSTEM (1966) (explaining his centrist, progressive conservative beliefs in both limited
government, robust civil rights and social uplift through access to the free market). See
also Leah Wright Rigueur, Neoliberal Social Justice: From Ed Brooke to Barack Obama,
ITEMS: INSIGHTS FROM SOC. SCI. (May 30, 2017) (ascribing to Sen. Brooks a black
neoliberal ideology that finds solutions to racial inequality in wealth via individual
success in the free market), http://items.ssrc.org/neoliberal-social-justice-from-edbrooke-to-barack-obama [https://perma.cc/S3SJ-P3FD].
163. See RICHARD K. GREEN & STEPHEN MALPEZZI, A PRIMER ON U.S. HOUSING MARKETS AND
HOUSING POLICY 92, 96–98 (2003). The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968
contained programs to provide homeownership for the poor through interest rate
subsidies for low- and moderate-income families to purchase houses (Section 235
Homeowner Assistance Program) and interest rate subsides for developers who agreed
to build and lease dwellings to low-income persons in suburban locations (Section 236
Rental Assistance Act). Id.
164. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). A
proposed development that would be racially integrated was denied by a town that was
99 percent white. The effort to integrate was entitled to no higher land use protection
because the U.S. Constitution was deemed insensitive to racial exclusion and segregation.
Id. Thus, the Constitution would only respond where the official was not savvy enough
to avoid letting bad thoughts be known. Under this rationale, the ordinary rules of
zoning granted a collective right to exclude. Id.
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What does it mean that the primary legislative vehicle for advancing
integration adopted a less than radical definition of integration?165 The
pragmatism reflected in the bill certainly reflects only glimmers of an ideal,
tempered by the reality of of staunch attachment to racial segregation.
Unwilling, or perhaps unable, to confront such opposition, the FHA utilized
a limited prohibitory approach and promoted a very limited form of
integration when it advanced housing laws that, in theory, opened up housing
markets to everyone regardless of race. However, it did not address the
structural discrimination that would make it impossible for all but a limited
number of elite Blacks to escape the ghetto.166 The drafters’ vision was to
dismantle ghetto by allowing middle-class Blacks to access the level of housing
their incomes would actually allow. The drafters were acutely aware of the
need to deal with Blacks left in the ghetto. But rather than incorporate them
explicitly into a vision of integration, the FHA opted for the more politically
feasible route of managing discrimination by maneuvering around it. The
FHA’s remedy then and now is to attain integration through mobility to escape
from the segregated, low-income neighborhoods for the black poor. Low- and
moderate-income housing programs, such as the Section 235 program, were
intended to be complementary legislation that would provide access for
lower-income Blacks through purchasing power.167 Funds were also intended
to increase the supply of low-cost housing in suburban areas. The first
program ended in a scandal of predatory abuse.168

165. JORGE ANDRES SOTO & DEIDRE SWESNIK, AM. CONST. SOC’Y ISSUE BRIEF, THE PROMISE OF
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE ROLE OF FAIR HOUSING ORGANIZATIONS 17 (2012)
(“[I]ntegration is thought of as a dream and not a possible reality . . . .”).
166. 114 CONG. REC. 2278 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (“[A] substantial market of
financially able Negroes [are] prevented from buying housing of their choice because of deeply
entrenched patterns of discrimination in the sale and rental of housing in our country.”).
167. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 235, 82 Stat. 476, 476–77
(1968) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 401(d), 101 Stat. 1898, 1899 (1988)). See Michael H.
Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated
Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1312 (1995) (“Section 235 was designed to
make capital more available to lower-income urban homebuyers. From 1969 to 1979,
approximately 500,000 homes were purchased under the program. Nevertheless, in several
cities, rather than stabilizing inner-city communities, Section 235 promoted rapid neighborhood
racial transition and, in some instances, decline.”).
168. Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized Geography,
and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 895–96 (2011) (describing the predation connected
with the Section 235 program, the companion legislation to the FHA). See Priya S. Gupta,
Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief) Legal History, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 187, 218, 223
(2015) (for an insightful argument about the reification of the single-family house and the white
nuclear family in law and policy and the prerogative to exclude multifamily housing).
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Yet, the Act’s vision of integration was at best gradual, certainly minimal.
It seems fair to say the vision was of not pure integration but of a minimal
amount deemed bearable—antidiscrimination provisions that only reached
affluent or middle-class racial integration. This was understood at that time as an
inherent limitation to the legislation’s potential, which paradoxically doubled as
a selling point.169 Today, it is the problem of non-middle class, lower-income
racial segregation that continues to pose the biggest challenge.170
Today, the Fair Housing Act does more to treat the structural aspect of
segregation as an obstacle to integration. The Supreme Court in Inclusive
Communities v. Texas validated a longstanding view that a FHA claim was not
limited to intentional discrimination, but could also challenge decisions
resulting in disparate racial impact. This interpretation included decisions
that perpetuated segregation by promoting community segregative effect, in
effect, recognizing that the FHA could be violated by structure: Habitual
practices of financing and implementing the construction and location of
affordable housing could have a disparate impact on minorities.171 By not
requiring proof of discriminatory intent, the Court recognized that past
practices shaped a racial geographical hierarchy such that today’s government
approval of new development projects, whether intentional or not, could
perpetuate segregation.172 This other aspect of the FHA that sought to address
structural barriers to integration was by requiring the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) to monitor the structural effects of federal
funding, and to “affirmatively further” Fair Housing.173 This has been
understood to mean, at the very least, federal funds should not be used by

169. See supra note 161.
170. See Wendell E. Pritchett, Where Shall We Live? Class and the Limitations of Fair Housing
Law, 35 URB. L. 399 (2003).
171. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2522–23 (2015) (recognizing that the FHA encompasses disparate impact liability, but
allowing leeway to housing authorities and private developers to explain and prove that
the policy in question serves a valid interest and requiring the plaintiff to make a prima
facie case for discriminatory impact).
172. Id.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d), (e)(5) (2006) (“All executive departments and agencies shall
administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban development
(including any Federal agency having regulatory or supervisory authority over financial
institutions) in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of [the FHA] and shall
cooperate with the Secretary [of HUD] to further such purposes.”). For a discussion of
the history of this provision, see Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to
Integrated Housing, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 126–28 (2011).

1182

66 UCLA L. R EV. 1140 (2019)

local governments to perpetuate segregation.174 Federally subsidized
affordable housing programs, as well as infrastructure subsidies which were
crucial to building racially integrated, workforce housing were rendered
ineffective by Executive Policy and inaction at HUD to use subsidized housing
funds to carry out this process.175 During the Obama Administration, HUD
comprehensively addressed this problem by adopting an extensive regulations
on advancing fair housing.176 Today, those regulations are in limbo.177
After the passage of the FHA, exclusionary practices continued largely
unchecked.178 As discussed above, poorly designed programs like the Section
235 program were exploited and failed to implement obvious solutions.179
Federal efforts by the Department of Housing and Urban Development were

174. See David D. Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as Metropolitan Equity, 65 BUFF. L. REV.
5, 45–46 (2017) (“The breadth of the definition of AFFH is almost limitless . . . the
definition . . . dislodges the anti-segregation aspect of the [FHA] from the anti-discrimination
prong.”); 114 Cong. Rec. H3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968); Schmidt v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 505 F.
Supp. 988, 996 n.1 (D. Mass. 1981) (quoting 114 CONG. RECORD 2527–28 (1968) (statement of
Sen. Brooke)) (“Today’s Federal housing official commonly inveighs against the evils of ghetto
life even as he pushes buttons that ratify their triumph—even as he ok’s public housing sites in
the heart of Negro slums, releases planning and urban renewal funds to cities dead-set against
integration, and approves the financing of suburban subdivisions from which Negroes will be
barred. These and similar acts are committed daily by officials who say they are unalterably
opposed to segregation, and have memos to prove it.”).
175. See LAMB, supra note 118, at 146, 159–60 (describing Nixon’s 1971 policy statement on
fair housing which promised suburbs not to force economic integration on them and to
defer to local control to promote racial integration on a voluntary basis).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 5.152 (2016) (stating that affirmatively
furthering fair housing means “taking meaningful actions that, taken together, address
significant disparities in housing needs and in access to opportunity, replacing
segregated living patterns with truly integrated and balanced living patterns,
transforming racially and ethnically concentrated areas of poverty into areas of
opportunity, and fostering and maintaining compliance with civil rights and fair housing
laws”).
177. See Policy Minute: HUD Delays Critical Fair Housing Requirement, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR:
RES. & POL’Y. (Mar. 9, 2018), http://furmancenter.org/thestoop/entry/policy-minutehud-delays-critical-fair-housing-requirement [https://perma.cc/9W3B-LLKR].
178. SHARKEY, supra note 145, at 53. See Schwemm, supra note 173, at 176 (“[T]he 2000
Census demonstrated that, while residential racial segregation of Blacks has been
declining slightly, it still is at such high levels that if it continued to decline at the same
rate, it would be decades before a moderate level of segregation were reached.”); see also
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965,
1975 (2000) (“The magnitude of the [racial segregation in housing] problem has
remained relatively static over the last half century.”).
179. Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy:
Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1312–13 (1995).
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thwarted.180 Many of the high poverty black neighborhoods of the 1960s continue
to be the high poverty neighborhoods of today.181
The structure of the FHA and its trajectory of ineffective enforcement
for low-income Blacks reflects that in a capitalist society, access to racial
integration through law will always be mediated by class. The reality that
there are, in effect, two types of integration—middle class and non-middle
class—also means that mobility for one group comes with immobility for
another, resulting in unaddressed costs and tension. The ability to integrate
for the black middle class is simultaneously the right to withdraw from the
poor.182 While the FHA appears to address a fundamental deprivation of a
right based on one’s skin color and African heritage, it imperfectly addressed
that the right can also be denied by income which is structured by race. This,
however, is consistent with the American world view that a denial based on
income would not be a legally cognizable harm and nor should it be.183

III.

MIXED-INCOME HOUSING AS DISCRIMINATION MANAGEMENT

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the challenge for mixing is
the need and habit of discrimination via the race and class expectation of
domination. Racial segregation reflects racially discriminatory preferences
that are habitual and based on aversion, fear, and stereotype. It reflects social
networks, and their communicated perceptions of desirability, connection,
and safety. Lastly, racial segregation reflects financial investments in status
and fierce defense of that status against inclusion. The result is metropolitan
areas characterized by racialized concentrations of poverty and affluence that
reflect overinvestments and disinvestments and result in drastically different
living experiences based on race and class. At the extremes, there are
neighborhoods filled with amenities and others starved of amenities and
overpoliced. Thus, this geographic manifestations of race and class
discrimination are demonstrably deeply embedded, highly valued, and nearly
impossible to dislodge.
180. See LAMB, supra note 118, at 159–60 (detailing George Romney’s determined efforts to
enforce the affirmatively further mandate).
181. Douglas S. Massey, Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Place? The Emerging
Consensus on Neighborhoods and Stratification, 42 CONTEMP. SOC. 690, 693 (2013) (“The
same neighborhoods that were disadvantaged in 2000 were disadvantaged in 1990, not
to mention 1980, 1970, and 1960.”).
182. For a fuller explanation of this argument, see McFarlane, supra note 65, at 168–69.
183. See ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 16–
23 (2006) (“[C]oncluding that the case for fostering greater income integration is not yet
proven.”).
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By prohibiting racial discrimination in housing,184 we have declared it
unlawful to deny opportunities for housing on the basis of race or that bear more
heavily on a protected group. This prohibition reflects two distinct but interrelated
understandings of antidiscrimination protections. One understanding is based on a
colorblind anticlassification principle which formally treats race as an arbitrary,
invalid criterion. Implicit in the formal prohibition is the concern that
individuals subject to arbitrary treatment are deprived of basic rights and their
ability to survive or thrive. The cumulative effect for a group of people
consistently subjected to such treatment is subordination or second-class
citizenship. The anticlassification principle is in tension, however, with
antisubordination concerns. Many assume that formal prohibitions on racial
classification prevent any consideration of race in efforts to ameliorate
negative conditions or improve the circumstances of a subordinated group.185
While this assumption has certainly been considered extensively in the
affirmative action context,186 little if any attention has been paid to a corollary
principle or concern—is it ever proper to take into account, during policy
making, a preference for discrimination? Despite legal proscriptions against
discrimination, discrimination certainly persists. When Derrick Bell
famously observed that racism was permanent, it seemed a hopeless, even
demoralizing, observation.187 Yet it turns out that this insight is borne out by
data showing the enduring nature of racial disparities,188 and is also consistent
with the social domination theory’s insights that an integral part of social
relations and psychology in the United States are the individual and
institutional actions that create and maintain a social hierarchy.
How should the omnipresence of discrimination be reflected in law,
advocacy, and policy? As mixed-income housing policy shows, we tacitly
understand, and policies reflect, that we often concede or cater to a certain

184. See John A. Powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act
at 40, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. 605, 615 (2008) (“The focus on anti-discrimination
normative measures has served to increase the freedom of choice for homebuyers, but it
has not necessarily helped produce integrated neighborhoods or addressed segregated
living patterns.”).
185. Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the California Civil
Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1138–41 (1996).
186. Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical
Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making
Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1046–48 (1997).
187. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1993); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
153 (1989).
188. See, e.g., Sharkey supra note 145, at 54.
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amount of discrimination. These policies show that we, both consciously and
unconsciously, manage discrimination by catering to it, even as we say we
want to fight it. The poor door and its parent, mixed-income housing, force
us to consider the extent to which existing preference for discrimination may
validly be factored into our integration efforts. Is it ever morally just to
concede to discrimination?189 When? How much discrimination is tolerable?
How much is too much? What should policymakers do?190
In the face of what seems to be an enduring geography of race and class
separation in housing, a mixed-income housing scheme is certainly a creative
discrimination management response.
Such schemes tacitly take
discriminatory preferences, like preferences for homogeneity or dislikes that
manifest in aversion, into account and accommodate them. This is
discrimination management—pragmatically considering discrimination as
inevitable and managing it by working to cater to some dimensions of it while
carefully working around other parts of it. Yet engaging in such
discrimination management is an unacknowledged fraught endeavor. The
New York City and London poor doors were crude, stigmatizing efforts to
overtly cater to discriminatory impulses. The doors were not mere matters of
convenience but a way of signaling preferred or high status to some users and
lack of status to others. Accordingly, the poor doors demonstrate that the
overall project of mixed-income housing has managed discrimination in a
manner that is not self-aware nor self-critical. Mixed-income housing
uncritically accepts discriminatory preferences as justified because they
mirror policymakers’ own biases and what they consider to be desirable living
arrangements. Moreover, low-income persons are stereotyped and cut off
from receiving the valuable resource of housing because they are defined as as
only eligible for a limited share. Managing discrimination in this way leads to
a housing scarcity that perpetuates, if not exacerbates, the problem it intended
to solve. The ways in which mixed-income housing has been conceived and
189. See ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES–THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 22 (2001); DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION
WRONG? (2008).
190. Scholars have partially considered these questions in Supreme Court Equal Protection
jurisprudence with the observation that, over time, antidiscrimination protections have
been minimized to avoid political backlash and prevent perceived balkanization. Reva
Siegel argues that recent Supreme Court decisions have reflected an antibalkanization
principle: The Court has “voted to uphold and to restrict race conscious remedies
because of concern about social divisiveness which, they believe, both extreme racial
stratification and unconstrained racial remedies can engender.” Reva Siegel, From
Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1278 (2011).
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deployed through inclusionary zoning suggests we have failed to question
whether we unacceptably perpetuate discrimination by conceding too much
to prevailing structures and norms of race and class discrimination in land use.
As the following discussion will show, mixed-income housing is premised on
sneaking the poor in, disguising their presence, dispersing them, and avoiding
a tipping point where the communities would become unattractive to the
affluent. It also relies on legitimizing myths like the benefits of role models
for the poor.
A.

Managing Neighborhood Opposition Through Microintegration

Since the passage of the FHA, it was understood that desegregation
would involve mobility of Blacks from cities to suburbs, allowing them to
follow the trajectory of development, economic activity, and jobs to the
suburbs.191 As the legislative history demonstrates, the Fair Housing Act of
1968 was premised on the policy solution of facilitating geographic mobility to
address the then-recognized problem of spatial mismatch between black people in
cities needing jobs that were moving to the suburbs.192 The non-middle-class black
person confined by geography and transportation to the central cities would not
be able to benefit from such legal proscriptions without supply-side
interventions—funding to subsidize low- to moderate-income
homeownership and funding for construction of affordable housing in
suburban areas. The road out of segregation and poverty required a triage
approach193 to provide both escape and access to amenity-rich places and their
associated opportunities—good jobs, well-funded schools, and
transportation.194
The effort to promote geographic mobility and integration post FHA was
largely stymied by exclusionary zoning and neighborhood opposition.195
Geographic mobility is still believed to be the key to deconcentrating black
segregation and the cornerstone of housing policy with mixed-income
housing as the preferred housing design. According to Patrick Sharkey:
“ . . . research on neighborhood and the life course demonstrates
that changes in geographic location—particularly among youth in
191. See Schwemm, supra note 173.
192. See 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
193. See 114 CONG. REC. 2991 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke) (discussing the complex array of
solutions needed to promote desegregation).
194. Id.
195. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 52–53, 122–23; KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER
241–43 (1985).
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highly segregated cities or metropolitan areas-- frequently lead to
or coincide with disruptions in patterns of inequality, suggesting
that when young adults relocate, they will experience the most
substantial changes to multiple dimensions of their lives.”196

But the benefits of mobility seem to decline as the ages of the children
increase.197
There is also a debate about whether geographic mobility is the answer
to the consequences of disinvestment in black, segregated, and impoverished
neighborhoods. Critics question mobility’s costs in terms of loss of
community ties and racial and class isolation in the new jurisdictions.198 Some
question the impact on communities left behind as the most capable are
enabled to leave, and instead argue in favor of community development
strategies that focus on fixing up areas of concentrated poverty instead.199
Still, others argue that mobility and community development are not
mutually exclusive. New developments in both city and suburb should be
mixed income. Still, others point out that this facilitates gentrification in
certain markets.200
From a housing advocacy point of view, a mobility strategy is still the best
option to allow lower-income people to access housing that is close to good
196. Patrick Sharkey, Temporary Integration, Resilient Inequality: Race and Neighborhood Change in
the Transition to Adulthood, 49 DEMOGRAPHY 889, 892 (2012) (citations omitted).
197. Sharkey, supra note 196, at 905 (“Whereas whites experience slight declines in neighborhood
poverty as they age beyond 25, the trend toward declining neighborhood poverty among African
Americans who exit their county of origin flattens and reverses as they age further into
adulthood. In early adulthood, there is a clear trend toward racial equality among young adults
who exit highly segregated metropolitan areas, but the long-term trend suggests a reproduction
of inequality in neighborhood poverty as black and white young adults move further into
adulthood.”).
198. See Mary Pattillo, Investing in Poor Black Neighborhoods ‘As Is’, in PUBLIC HOUSING AND
THE LEGACY OF SEGREGATION (Margery Austin Turner, Susan J. Popkin, and Lynette
Rawlings eds., 2009); Sharkey, supra note 145 (arguing for sustained investments in
nonwhite, low-income communities.).
199. See Norrinda Brown Hayat, Urban Decolonization, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 75 (2018).
(arguing against mobility programs and in favor of community development). See also
Calmore, supra note 154, at 1492, 1507 (arguing that policy should emphasize spatial
equality which would be a form of “territorial reparations” and link black interests across
class lines).
200. See, e.g., Samuel Dastrup & Ingrid Gould Ellen, Linking Residents to Opportunity:
Gentrification and Public Housing, 18 CITYSCAPE (2016) (exemplifying the kinds of
markets where mixed-income redevelopment would provide increased housing
opportunities for gentrifiers and comparatively fewer opportunities for low-income
housing), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/community-development/events
/2016/research-symposium-on-gentrification/pdfs/dastrup-ellen.pdf?la=en;
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/cityscpe/vol18num3/article4.html
[https://perma.cc/5QYD-LYS4].

1188

66 UCLA L. R EV. 1140 (2019)

employment, schools, and transportation.201 Mixed-income housing presents an
effective way to avoid one of the enduring obstacles to construction of affordable
housing—neighbor opposition.202 That opposition is generally based on negative
assumptions about the racial identity and socioeconomic status of the potential
residents of a proposed development, and the perceived impact on one’s
neighborhood’s status and property values. Such neighborhood opposition is
situational as well as structural, taking the form of vigorous neighborhood
objections. Such opposition becomes embedded in zoning ordinances that
make multifamily housing discretionary with willing enforcement by public
officials.203 Mixed-income housing, as such, is an integration strategy
premised on microintegration—suburbs would also have to allow multifamily
housing to be developed, which may be supported by federal funding through
Section 8 vouchers. Objections are avoided by building upscale, market-rate
multifamily housing with a set aside of a smattering of subsidized units. The
advantage of microintegration is that developments can be built so lowerincome units are not visible. A building or development could retain an
upper-income status because the overall image is middle or upper middle
class, while ostensibly serving a social purpose. Because mixed-income
housing’s microintegration is small, happening on an almost imperceptible
level, the poor can, in effect, be sneaked into the suburbs in ways not possible
before. Integration would happen in a stealth manner by educating existing
residents that such developments are not that bad, while also maintaining a
middle-class reputational dignity for the area. This reputational dignity

201. See JOHN POWELL, REMEDIAL PHASE EXPERT REPORT OF JOHN POWELL IN THOMPSON V. HUD (2005),
http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2005/9_2005_ThompsonvHUDRemedialReport
.pdf. See generally Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in
Regional Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 333, 348 (2007) (“Studies of these mobility programs have shown a variety of
important benefits for the families who were enabled to move and for the community at large.
The benefits involve not only education and employment, but also health, environmental, and
economic advantages.”).
202. See John Zipperer, The Debate Over Mixed-Income Housing, AFFORDABLE HOUS. FIN. (Jan. 1,
2006),
http://www.housingfinance.com/management-operations/the-debate-over-mixedincome-housing_o [https://perma.cc/J747-D75Y] (“ [T]he lesson some people drew from the
failure of public housing: We just had too many poor people; therefore we’ll kind of hide the poor
people in these mixed-income developments and good things will happen to them.”).
203. See Nguyen, supra note 115. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) (refusing to take cognizance of opposition to affordable housing based
on perceived black identity of residents); Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found.,
538 U.S. 188 (2003); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
These are only select examples. The examples of neighborhood opposition to affordable
housing are numerous, if not ubiquitous.
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would likewise extend to the lower-income residents by allowing them to
avoid the stigma of affordable housing.204
There are consequences, however, of requiring the poor residents to
sneak into a community to ameliorate opposition to their presence. First, by
necessity, inclusionary housing is focused on only new developments, leaving
existing exclusionary zoning intact, like a magnet school or a magnet place
approach. This “magnet place”205 approach pretends that integration is now
a product to be marketed. However, this is a limited, controlled, and often
illusory integration. Several obvious limits include the relatively small
number of units produced by the minimal set aside approach. The units are
usually affordable for the moderate-income person rather than the low- or
very low-income person who requires an individual, stigmatizing subsidy.206
Also, because mixed-income housing development is a way to work around
existing patterns of segregation, by hiding integration’s presence and avoiding
neighbor opposition, it grants access to areas, services, and amenities that would
otherwise be unavailable. It also simply provides a place to live. But thorny
issues about how to fairly design these communities are rarely considered
openly. Instead, design is often only discussed in terms of financial viability
(how many subsidized units can the developer afford) when in fact, social
assumptions and presumed discomforts shape the entire conception of the
mixed-income project. This means that the number and types of these units
will likely remain low, resulting in far fewer affordable housing units than are
needed to address the unmet demand.

204. See MOLLY M. SCOTT ET AL., POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE:
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM 34 (2013)
(advocacy guide explaining when seeking to create a housing mobility program to consider
avoiding using terms like “affordable housing” to avoid property owner and community leader
resistance.) https://www.prrac.org/pdf/ExpandingChoice.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U2N-A6FS].
205. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE
L.J. 2043, 2064–65 (2002) (“Like traditional alternative schools, magnet schools typically
offer specialized programs or curricular themes . . . [and are] designed to encourage
racial integration . . . .”).
206. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1011 (“[T]he recipients of many inclusionary housing units
are themselves middle-class suburbanites.”). Ellickson also argues that states with
inclusionary zoning policies continue to “impose unusually severe legal constraints on
housing supply. Collectively, their perverse policies include exclusionary zoning
practices, strict growth controls, and complex environmental reporting requirements
that enable opponents to delay (and sometimes derail) proposed housing developments.”
Id. at 1020–21.
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Managing by (Over) Elevating Concentration of Poverty Theory

Mixed-income housing’s microintegration approach means that each
building has a limited number of units for low- to moderate-income
residents.207 The low ratio of lower-income units is considered to have
distinct internal benefits within the new community.208 Mixed-income
housing is often justified as avoiding a new concentration of poverty and its
ill-effects, called neighborhood effects, or at least as allowing them to be
managed and counteracted.209 Under this logic, one could assume that the
fewer poor residents the better. After all, the conditions in areas of concentrated
poverty speak for themselves. First, residents of racially segregated areas of high
poverty are subject to high rates of violent crime—“high-poverty environments
are criminogenic, encouraging youth to pursue criminal rather than
legitimate careers.”210 Second, the poor experience spatial mismatch between
places where jobs are available and where they reside.211 Third, schools in
areas of concentrated poverty tend to be educationally ineffective and have
high dropout rates.212 These facts seem to reflect common sense that
concentrated poverty and the correlated negative neighborhood effects are
results of the actions and decisions of poor neighborhood residents.213
Yet assumptions about the concentration of poverty underlying the
support for mixed-income housing have been decontextualized and
overstated. The concentration of poverty thesis is premised on the
207. See Constantine E. Kontokosta, Mixed-Income Housing and Neighborhood Integration:
Evidence from Inclusionary Zoning Programs, 36 J. URB. AFF. 716, 737–38 (2016)
(comparing efficacy of two communities’ inclusionary zoning programs in promoting
racial and economic integration and diversity).
208. Id. See also Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s Contributions to Both
Affordable Housing and Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 585 (2015).
209. See generally Jacob W. Faber & Patrick Sharkey, Neighborhood Effects, INTL. ENCY. SOC.
& BEHAV. SCI. 443 (2015) (reviewing data and literature of neighborhood effects).
210. Lincoln Quillian, Segregation and Poverty Concentration, The Role of Three Segregations,
77 AM. SOC. REV. 354, 355 (2012).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See NAT’L COMM’N ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUB. HOUS., A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
AND THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1992); John O. Calmore,
Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: Hewing A Stone of Hope from a Mountain
of Despair, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1243–46 (1995) (rejecting “culture of segregation”
justifications for integration as failing to acknowledge structural reasons for conditions
in high poverty black neighborhoods); Laura M. Tach, More Than Bricks and Mortar:
Neighborhood Frames, Social Processes, and the Mixed-Income Redevelopment of a Public
Housing Project, 8 CITY & COMMUNITY 269, 273–74 (2009) (describing a process of framing
neighborhoods that creates narratives of neighborhoods based on selective perceptions that are
filtered through cultural categories.).
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hyperconcentration of poverty learned through the history of public
housing’s perpetuation of the racialized concentration of poverty. The
sociological literature indicates, however, that concentrated poverty is a
particular geographic phenomenon more correctly understood as a symptom
rather than a cause.214 It reflects the consequences of decisions made by the
rest of the society to disinvest from those areas.215 A community that is
characterized by concentration of poverty will have few to no amenities. That
is a function of the behavior of the wider society towards that neighborhood
rather than any inherent characteristic of the neighborhood itself. Relatedly,
Ruth Person and Lauren Krivo have documented that the level of crime,
disorder, and violence in high poverty neighborhoods varies by race and class,
with white families experiencing a vastly better neighborhood circumstance
than black and Latino families.216 Their research also shows that when they
controlled for similarities in educational and socioeconomic characteristics,
the differences between black and white neighborhoods was reduced
significantly.217
With improvements in statistical methods, recent social science research
examining the neighborhoods effects hypothesis confirms that the impact of
high poverty on neighborhoods is persistent, has increased over time, and is
devastating to residents.218 This literature also demonstrates that the

214. See NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REVANCHIST CITY,
62–63 (1st ed. 1996) (“The physical deterioration and economic devalorization of innercity neighborhoods is a strictly logical, “rational” outcome of the operation of the land
and housing markets. This is not to suggest it is at all natural, however, for the market
itself is a social product. Far from being inevitable, neighborhood decline is the result of
public and private investment decisions. . . . [T]here is enough control by, and
integration of, the investment and development actors in the real estate industry that
their decisions go beyond a response and actually shape the market.”); Mark Beaulieu &
Tracey Continelli, Benefits of Segregation for White Communities: A Review of the
Literature and Directions for Future Research, 15 J. AF. AM. STUDIES 487, 501 (2011)
(describing the ways in which disinvestment from inner city neighborhoods benefits
suburban neighborhoods).
215. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67.
216. Lauren J. Krivo, Ruth D. Peterson & Danielle C. Kuhl, Segregation, Racial Structure, and
Neighborhood Violent Crime, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1765, 1793 (2009).
217. Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Segregated Spatial Locations, Race-Ethnic
Composition, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
93, 106 (2009) (“[W]e demonstrate that indeed the social and economic character that
exists within neighborhoods is critical for producing large differentials in violence across
areas with distinct racial and ethnic compositions.”).
218. LAURA TACH, ROLF PENDALL & ALEXANDRA DERIAN, WHAT WORKS COLLABORATIVE,
INCOME MIXING ACROSS SCALES: RATIONALE, TRENDS, POLICIES, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH
FOR MORE INCLUSIVE NEIGHBORHOODS AND METROPOLITAN AREAS 12 (2014).
Concentrated poverty has increased over the past four decades. Id. In metropolitan
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concentration of poverty is a function of exclusion and disinvestment, not a
cause. According to Lincoln Quillian, in the United States, a notable
difference in the typical lives of white, black, and Hispanic people is the
economic class of the people in their social environments. White middle-class
families overwhelmingly live in middle-class neighborhoods and send their
children to middle-class schools. Many black and Hispanic middle-class
parents, however, live in working class or poor neighborhoods and send their
children to high-poverty schools. About one in three poor white families live
in poor neighborhoods and send their children to high-poverty schools,
compared to two in three poor black and Hispanic families.219
Quillian has thus developed a more nuanced explanation of the causes
of the negative effects of racial segregation for concentrated poverty.
Concentration of poverty involves an interaction between three types of
segregation: 1) racial segregation of black and Hispanic families from affluent
white families, 2) intraracial income segregation; and 3) racial segregation of
working and middle-class Blacks from high- and middle-income members of
other racial groups.220 These phenomena lead to an accumulation of
advantage and disadvantage.221
Approximately 50 percent of Blacks lived in the poorest 25 percent of
urban neighborhoods for at least two generations while just 7 percent of
Whites lived in similar neighborhoods.222 These effects have been shown to
be determined by structurally produced conditions in high poverty
neighborhoods rather than by family background.223 In particular, the effect
of poverty concentration and neighborhood circumstances has implications,

219.
220.

221.
222.
223.

areas, the percent of residents in “high poverty” neighborhoods increased from 6.4
percent in 1970 to 9.1 in 1990, declined to 7.2 percent during the 1990s, and since 2000
has increased by almost 12 percent. Id. Therefore, nearly 30 million people live in high
poverty neighborhoods, 9.2 million live in census tracts with extreme poverty. Id. See
also Quillian, supra note 210, at 357. Very helpful thank you.
Quillian, supra note 210, at 355.
Quillian, supra note 210, at 375–76. Quillian clarifies that on the third axis, black and
Hispanic people differ. Poor Hispanic people experience less segregation but still tend
to live with poor, non-Hispanic neighbors. Thus, reducing segregation for Hispanic
Americans has a weaker effect in reducing poverty. Middle class black individuals have
high contact with poor black people, which contributes to their comparatively fragile
economic position. Id. at 376.
See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION
SYSTEM (2007) (discussing the concentration of poverty and the concentration of
affluence as both being inherently problematic).
Massey, supra note 181, at 694 (“According to Sharkey, roughly half of the African
Americans he studied had lived in the poorest quarter of urban neighborhoods for at
least two consecutive generations compared with just 7 percent of whites . . . .”).
Id.
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not so much for upward mobility, but for downward mobility—“the prospects
for downward mobility are much greater for blacks than whites.”224 Patrick
Sharkey’s work supports these findings, establishing that Blacks have a
persistent and unique exposure over multiple generations to concentrated
poverty that explains the persistence of inequality in income and wealth.225
According to Patrick Sharkey, “[t]he social environments surrounding
African Americans . . . make it difficult for families to preserve their
advantaged position in the income distribution and to transmit these
advantages to their children.”226
In its traditionally understood sense, concentration of poverty is
considered socially and economically destructive, with individual and
community consequences. Living in high poverty neighborhoods has been
shown to be highly detrimental, if not traumatic, especially for children who
grow up in and attend schools there.227 The negative effects are compounded
when the poverty in these same neighborhoods is intergenerational.228 The
individual consequences of poverty concentration include “involvement in
criminal activity, gang membership, unemployment, employment in the
informal economy, school underachievement and teenage child bearing.”229
The community consequences or neighborhood effects include “higher crime
rates, more observable public disorder and weaker institutional and political
connections to the rest of the city than non-poor neighborhoods.”230 The
exposure to concentrated disadvantage is now thought to lead to deleterious
health, and even cognitive, effects by virtue of the impact from impoverished,

Id.; SHARKEY, supra note 145, at 101, 114–15.
SHARKEY, supra note 145, at 115.
Id. at 115.
See Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The Hope of
the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 L. & Ineq. 269, 281 (2006) (“As ‘fifty years
of sociological data have made clear: being born into a poor family places students at risk,
but to be assigned then to a school with a high concentration of poverty poses a second,
independent disadvantage that poor children attending middle-class schools do not
face.’”); David Dante Troutt, Trapped in Tragedies: Childhood Trauma, Spatial
Inequality, and Law, 101 Marq. L. Rev. 601, 612 (2018) (“Children living in isolated,
concentrated poverty are at highest risk for exposure to complex trauma.”).
228. See George J. Borjas, Ethnic Capital and Intergenerational Mobility, 107 Q. J. ECON. 123,
147 (1992) (demonstrating “[t]he skills and labor market outcomes of today's generation
depend not only on the skills and labor market experiences of their parents, but also on
the average skills and labor market experiences of the ethnic group in the parent's
generation”).
229. Tach, supra note 213, at 270.
230. Id.
224.
225.
226.
227.
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violence-prone, stigmatized neighborhoods.231
However, one cannot
presume that this is always the case. Concentration of poverty is isolating as
people do not have access to job networks nor role models to embody
examples of success, or provide educational or employment networks. The
possibilities for achievement and attainment are constrained or unavailable to
residents, and in particular to children. Thus, the popular lesson that seems
to have been taken from study of the concentrated poverty phenomenon is an
odd one. Rather than help poor people to not be poor through perhaps
income redistribution, the conclusion seems paradoxically to be that the best
way to help poor people is by not having too many other poor people around.
The mantra holds not that there should be fewer poor people in general, but
that there should be a limit on entry of poor people into a residential area.
Preventing the concentration of poverty would seem to be of benefit not
just for the elites, who avoid the dysfunction as well as the race and class
geographic stigmatization by the wider society. But, the problems of the
concentration of poverty are not fully understood as either cause or effect.
Laura Tach points out, that there is no actual research examining these
commonly held assumptions about neighborhood effects, which are in large
part based on anecdotal observations.232 She questions, for example, whether
people engaging in dysfunctional behavior are influenced to do so by these
neighborhoods, or are simply drawn to them because they are inexpensive.233
Thus, it is not clear what the chain of causation is or whether it is solely based
on correlation.
Mixed-income housing being understood as a way to avoid the
concentration of poverty means that it embodies a form of discrimination
management that works to the disadvantage of the poor by suggesting one
cannot build affordable housing simply for people of low or modest income.
It means that they have to wait for space to open up in mixed developments only.
This plainly suggests that the mixed-income approach is not actually a policy to
benefit poor people. It means that the purpose of mixed income is a place-based
policy, to ameliorate and prevent an area from being economically and racially
identified as poor and Black. In order to fit into the mainstream economy, to reap
231. See Douglas Massey & Brandon Wagner, Segregation, Stigma, and Stratification: A
Biosocial Model, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STIGMA, DISCRIMINATION, AND HEALTH
147, 164 (Brenda Major et al. eds., 2018).
232. Laura M. Tach, The Stability of Mixed-Income Neighborhoods, ANNUAL MEETING AM.
SOC. ASS’N 1, 2–4 (2009).
233. Laura Marie Tach, BEYOND CONCENTRATED POVERTY: THE SOCIAL AND TEMPORAL
DYNAMICS OF MIXED-INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS 1 (Apr. 22, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author).
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the benefits of more affluent Whites being willing to live there, it is important to
keep the low-income populations low. Even if poor people have resources to spend,
their resources are devalued socially; they are not the type of customer national
businesses want to serve.234 This aspect of mixed-income housing as discrimination
management means it responds to the reality that the society will not deal with the
poor, therefore too many of them cannot be around. By elevating a dispersal
and concentration of poverty rationale, it obscures that concentration of
poverty is, instead, a distinct geographical phenomenon. It conflates effects
with causes—the cause of concentration of poverty is everyone else—so those
who have taken flight and disinvested are normalized and held not
responsible.
C.

Managing the Tipping Point

The quest to integrate requires not just accomplishing integration but
maintaining it. Though racism may be permanent, integration seems to
promise less polarization and less inequality as it reduces separation. As long
as the Fair Housing Act has been pursuing integration, the potential fragility
of that integration, because of the realities of race and class dynamics in
neighborhoods, has been apparent. Black people, freed by the Fair Housing
Act, experienced White people begin to flee not long after they had moved
into white neighborhoods. History shows that some of this flight was
manufactured by predatory blockbusting tactics that were used to inflame
white fears, but the phenomenon had enough legs on its own absent those
techniques to warrant judicial notice.235
Thus early Fair Housing
jurisprudence was developed during this backdrop of white flight from cities,
which was viewed as an inevitable, understandable phenomenon.236

234. See e.g., Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class and Suburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a ‘RaceMaking Situation,’ 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749, 770–72 (2002) (discussing lack of
retailers in affluent black communities around the United States).
235. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting the
existence of the “white flight” phenomenon and acknowledging that it may be considered
as a factor in the integration equation); United States v. Charlottesville Redevelopment
& Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461, 466 n.8 (W.D. Va. 1989); Jorman v. Veterans Admin.,
579 F. Supp. 1407 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (challenging the Veterans Administration of causing
or contributing to white flight as a result of its home mortgage loan guaranty service).
236. See Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1102; see generally Peter H. Schuck, Judging
Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES
L. REV. 289, 297–99 (2002) (exploring efforts to maintain racial balance and the dynamics
of white flight).
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In acknowledging that the Fair Housing Act had the twin, and often
conflicting, goals of antidiscrimination and integration, the courts generally
upheld integration quotas as a necessary reality to maintain racially balanced
communities.237 The next kind of integration problems arose in the context
of federally sponsored housing projects, and the manner in which the
obligation to advance fair housing and prevent segregation affected decisions
about racial makeup of tenant populations.238 The quest to promote and
achieve integration quickly ran into the problem of how to maintain that
integration. Often the articulated problem of maintaining integration was in
reality a subterfuge or pretext for discrimination.239 In other scenarios, the
Housing Authorities were genuinely seeking to maintain integration,
attempted to do so through policies that came at the expense of the poor black
tenants.240
It also became apparent that the goal of integration, which was always
under threat from white flight, was conceived from the perspective of white
people. In Otero, the New York Court of Appeals considered the local
Housing Authority’s resolution of what it believed to be a near irresolvable
tension between guaranteed rights of return to redeveloped public housing
and the reality that the tenants would be majority Black and thus constitute a
racially segregated community.241 The District Court reasoned that the
proper resolution was to prioritize the access to housing and to not deprive
someone of access to low cost public housing because of their race.242 The
court’s discussion about what constitutes integration is striking. The plaintiffs
asserted that “integration is achieved . . . when non-whites occupy 80% of a
given project as well as when 80% of the project is white, particularly
when . . . the Urban Renewal Area would probably be predominantly white
overall and the Authority itself admits that the Lower East Side as a whole is
237. See, e.g., Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1132 (2d Cir. 1973).
238. See Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1100–01 (rejecting landlord’s “claim to be ‘clothed
with governmental authority’ and thus obligated . . . to effectuate the purpose of the Fair
Housing Act by affirmatively promoting integration and preventing ‘the reghettoization
of a model integrated community’”).
239. See Ankur J. Goel, Maintaining Integration Against Minority Interests: An Anti-Subjugation
Theory for Equality in Housing, 22 URB. LAW. 369, 372–79 (1990).
240. Id.
241. Otero, 484 F.2d at 1124 (“[T]he effect of adherence to its regulation would be to create a nonwhite ‘pocket ghetto’ that would operate as a racial ‘tipping factor’ causing white residents to take
flight and leading eventually to non-white ghettoization of the community.”).
242. Id. at 1125 (“[A]lthough the Authority was under a constitutional and statutory duty to foster
and maintain racial integration, this duty could not . . . be given effect where to do so would be
to deprive a non-white minority of low cost public housing that would otherwise be assigned to
it . . . .”).
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48% white.”243 The Court effectively rejected this definition and instead
accepted the Housing Authority’s assertion that its duty to maintain
integration as equal to preventing concentrations of nonwhite residents that
would be off-putting to white residents.244 Thus, maintaining integration was
defined as policing the location of minorities so as to not offend white
sensibilities about desirable concentrations.245 The Housing Authority argued
that:
[L]arge concentrations of non-whites in one or more pockets within
the community would act as a “tipping” factor which would
precipitate an increase in the non-white population in the
surrounding neighborhoods, leading to a steady loss of total white
population over a given period of time. [The Housing Authority]
argues that it is under an obligation to prevent the formation of such
concentrations or pockets of non-whites[.]246

Otero’s rationale seems, today, strikingly paternalistic and misdirected in
emphasis. It views integration solely from the standpoint of the dissimilarity
index rather than understanding it to also be about the right to exercise a
choice. That choice was denied on the basis of race. The Court in Otero used
past decisions about segregatory decisions that either barred nonwhite
individuals from residing in white areas or relegated nonwhites to already
nonwhite areas.247 What the Court missed was that those decisions prevented
the freedom to choose to move. The decision about the choice to return or
stay was an entirely different issue—must the Housing Authority prevent a
poor nonwhite person from exercising that autonomy where it would
arguably result in concentrations of nonwhite people? The Otero court
answered yes.248

Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1134.
See S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Tp., 92 N.J. 158 (1983).
Otero, 484 F.2d. at 1133.
Id. at 1133 (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969),
aff’d 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970)).
248. See also Burney v. Hous. Auth. of Beaver Cty., 551 F. Supp. 746, 749 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(“[A] formal complaint against the Housing Authority charging that the Housing
Authority had violated, and was continuing to violate . . . Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act . . . by maintaining housing projects that were segregated by the race of the
tenant. . . . [A] Consent Order was designed to desegregate the Housing Authority’s low
income housing projects . . . through the use of a new tenant selection and assignment
procedure. [It creates] a target racial balance for each of the Housing Authority’s family
projects [and uses] an applicant’s race as a preferential determinant in order to reach and
maintain that target balance.”). The question raised by the Housing Authority’s use of
its integration maintenance plan, therefore, is whether an individual black may be made

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
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As early as the early 1970s, commentators noted that “[d]evelopers
anxious to avoid ‘tipping’ a project from white to black appear to set low
minority marketing goals.”249 In 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in U.S. v. Starrett City Associates crystallized who bore the
brunt of the cap:
The consequence of Starrett’s policy of maintaining racial balance
has been that Black applicants constitute a disproportionately larger
share [54%] of the waiting list for apartments than do Whites [22%],
and remain on the list for considerably longer periods of time than
do Whites . . . For a two-bedroom apartment, the average waiting
time on the list for qualified applicants was twenty months for
Blacks and two months for Whites; for a one-bedroom apartment,
the comparable figures were eleven months and four months.250

The most objectionable aspect of Starrett City’s integration maintenance
quotas was not the “use of race” as a criteria per se, but the disparate impact
of the use of race.251

to suffer exclusion in an effort to prevent resegregation of the system. Id. at 758. “There
is a limited usefulness in generalizing from tipping point experiences in a neighborhood,
where whites are free to buy and sell homes as they please, to low-income housing, where
demand exceeds supply and whites who are in need of housing may simply have to
suppress their intolerance for blacks in order to receive much needed housing. This
suggests that the tipping point is probably considerably higher in low-income housing
projects than in residential neighborhoods.” Id. at 767.
249. Bruce L. Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial
Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REV. 245 (1974); Eleanor P. Wolf, The Tipping-Point in
Racially Changing Neighborhoods, 29 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 3 (1963); John M. Goering,
Neighborhood Tipping and Racial Transition: A Review of Social Science Evidence, 44 J.
AM. INST. PLAN. 1 (1978); David Card et al., Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation, 123
Q. J. ECON. 177 (2008); Thomas C. Schelling, The Process of Residential Segregation:
Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157 (Anthony H.
Pascal ed., 1972); see Timothy R. Graham, The Benign Housing Quota: A Legitimate
Weapon to Fight White Flight and Resulting Segregated Communities?, 42 FORDHAM L.
REV. 891 (1974); Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Validity of Race-Conscious
Government Policies to Promote Residential Integration, 93 HARV. L. REV. 938 (1980);
Tipping the Scales of Justice: A Race-Conscious Remedy for Neighborhood Transition, 90
YALE L.J. 377 (1980).
250. See Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1104.
251. Id. at 1099.
[A]partment opportunities for blacks and hispanics were far fewer “than
would be expected if race and national origin were not taken into account,
while opportunities for whites were substantially greater than what their
application rates projected. Minority applicants waited up to ten times
longer than the average white applicant before they were offered an
apartment. Starrett City’s active file was 21.9% white in October 1985, but
whites occupied 64.7% of the apartments in January 1984. Although the
file was 53.7% black and 18% hispanic in October 1985, blacks and
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Starrett’s allocation of public housing facilities on the basis of racial
quotas, by denying an applicant access to a unit otherwise available solely
because of race, produces a “discriminatory effect . . . [that] could hardly be
clearer.”252 Such quotas do not provide minorities with access to Starrett City,
but rather, act as a ceiling to their access. Thus, the impact of appellants’
practices falls squarely on minorities, for whom Title VIII was intended to
create housing opportunities.253
Quantitatively, the program used white fears and behaviors as the
fulcrum of the policy and to the detriment of the black and Latino people who
bore the brunt of those fears.254 But the majority opinion concluded that only
colorblind criteria would pass muster without acknowledging that income
could be used as a proxy to accomplish the same thing.255 The goal of
maintaining integration at the expense of the supposed benefitted population
is highly problematic because it takes two things away—access to housing and
the right to choose where to live. The norms of mixing and integration have to
include that element of choice for the lower-income person.256
Inclusionary zoning incorporates the tipping rationale in the statutorily
defined inclusionary percentages.257 When perceived as a floor, the percentages
seem quite progressive as they ensure access where there otherwise would not
have been any. But they can also be a de facto ceiling, because no for-profit
developer is likely to exceed those percentages. Thus, inclusionary zoning
ordinances have established a statutorily controlling tipping percentage. This
hispanics, respectively, occupied only 20.8% and 7.9% of the apartments as
of January 1984.”
Id. (citing United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. 668, 672, 676 (E.D. N.Y.
1987)) (citations omitted).
252. Id. at 1100.
253. Id. at 1102.
254. Id. at 1104.
255. Id. at 1102.
256. See John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1073 (1998); Calmore, supra note 154, at 1507.
257. See URBAN INST., supra note 36, at 88 (surveying thirteen locations nationwide and
concluding that “[t]he percentage of affordable units to be side aside [under inclusionary
zoning ordinances] ranges from 4 to 30. The average in the 13 jurisdictions is 13
percent.”). But see Lawrence J. Vale & Shomon Shamsuddin, All Mixed Up: Making Sense
of Mixed-Income Housing Developments, 83 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N (2017) (establishing a
framework for assessing Hope VI mixed-income developments: (1) allocation—the
proportion and range of incomes included in projects; (2) proximity—the spatial scale at
which income mixing is intended; (3) tenure—the balance between rental housing and
homeownership units; and (4) duration—the amount of time projects remain mixedincome based on funding restrictions). Robert Ellickson argues that mixed income
housing should be located by the block or neighborhood rather than building by building
may, in theory, be acceptable and just as beneficial. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1016.
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percentage is particularly attenuated when applied to an individual
development. This tipping rationale shows mixed-income housing to be a
particular kind of integration maintenance technique that maintains white,
affluent dominance.
This resurrects something reminiscent of the Starrett City integration
maintenance policy, which was invalidated because it was explicitly
predicated on race. Inclusionary zoning similarly presents the question of
who bears the brunt of inclusionary housing minimum unit quotas. They are
a cap. They also disparately impact the poor and minority by defining their
presence in the community for reasons of social control, sensibilities, and
market rate residents’ preferences, rather than purely because of the financial
reasons typically offered. The financial reasons could in fact be tied into the
discriminatory inclinations, the class aversions, and the class cultural
preferences of the middle class.
Thus, the tipping point rationale is quietly embodied in mixed income
set aside percentages. Such percentages are understood as being related only
to the economic feasibility of the deal, but the reality is that social assumptions
and meanings are part of the definition. People are not aware nor focused on
the design as reflecting prejudice. “Concentrated poverty” is now used as a
causal factor rather than a descriptor of disinvestment. It is also code for
class-based discrimination.
Drawing again from social domination theory, the appeal of statutory
tipping rationale means mixed-income housing is structured in a way to allow
the upper and middle classes to dominate the lower class. There are definitely
class distinctions present in daily life, and these distinctions are particularly
important to social hierarchy.258 This illustrates that the need for social
domination, which shaped the persistence of racial residential segregation
through various iterations, also presents itself within the racial hierarchy
underlying the tipping rationale.
D.

Managing Through Modeling and Social Control—The Myth
of the Benevolent Middle Class259

The ways in which mixed-income housing fulfills the need for social
domination leads to its next limitation—mixed-income housing is supposed to

258. NILSON ARIEL ESPINO, BUILDING

THE INCLUSIVE
CONFRONTING URBAN SEGREGATION (2015).

CITY: THEORY

AND PRACTICE FOR

259. August, supra note 50, at 3405–06 (noting the “myth of the benevolent middle class” and
that “[s]upporters of redevelopment tend to draw on a common set of ideas and theories
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provide opportunities to mix and learn from role models.260 Mixed-income
housing is justified as being beneficial for lower-income individuals personally.
By socially mixing, the poor learn to aspire to something more than
unemployment and impoverishment. They see people with higher education
such as the doctor and the lawyer, and learn about the possibilities for
personal accomplishment and economic mobility.
Moreover, these
associational, role modeling opportunities are touted as societally beneficial
by providing social control benefits.
Mixed income’s cross-class integration fails to grapple with 1) how class
homogeneity is valued, 2) how status and dominance are determined by class
and race, and 3) how mixed-income housing flies in the face of this. The social
science literature answers the questions that the legal literature does not: 1)
does cross-class interaction among residents of mixed-income developments
take place meaningfully across income lines and 2) is this interaction
beneficial to low-income residents in terms of “access to employment,
information about schools, services, or other resources?”261 The answer to
these types of questions has been a resounding “no.”262 Residents tend to
interact with one another within a development “based on perceived
characteristics in common.”263 Consequently, this purported benefit does not
exist, though it reflects romanticized assumptions in our public discourse
about the benefits of integrated communities from the past.
Some researchers have advocated for the role model theory for children
in these communities—children benefit from exposure to adults engaging in
different career paths and lifestyles.264 Yet, the literature has shown that the

260.
261.

262.
263.
264.

to support and justify redevelopment, including neo-traditional design ideals, academic
‘deconcentration’ theory and planning wisdom favouring ‘social mix’”).
Mark L. Joseph, Robert J. Chaskin & Henry S. Webber, The Theoretical Basis for
Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development, 42 URB. AFF. REV. 369 (2007).
Diane K. Levy, Zach McDade & Kassie Bertumen, Mixed-Income Living: Anticipated and
Realized Benefits for Low-Income Households, 15 CITYSCAPE 15, 18 (2013) (“Compared
with the hypothesized benefits, the actual benefits from living in mixed-income
developments or income-diverse areas have been limited for low-income households. In
particular, investments have brought about environmental improvements to housing
and neighborhoods, but benefits tied to economic desegregation and poverty alleviation
have not been realized.”).
James C. Fraser, Robert J. Chaskin & Joshua Theodore Bazuin, Making Mixed-Income
Neighborhoods Work for Low-Income Households, 15 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. &
RESEARCH 83, 89 (2013).
Id. at 90. See also Glynn, supra note 72, at 78–80 (citing numerous studies from the U.K.
that conclude social mixing does not occur).
Joseph, Chaskin & Webber, supra note 260, at 391. See generally Raj Chetty, Nathaniel
Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on

1202

66 UCLA L. R EV. 1140 (2019)

role model and social networks experience does not work as theorized.265
According to the social science literature, the research has shown that mixedincome living has not galvanized people to enter the workforce and end
poverty, or broken down social barriers as expected.266 The residents of
mixed-income communities are often merely adults who likely are past the
role model stage or able to seek out role models on their own.
The other prominent expectation of mixed-income housing is its explicit
vision of social mixing. The social science literature shows, however, that this
social mixing is affected deeply by race and class expectations, and does not
seem to occur in any meaningful or beneficial way.267 Mark Joseph and Robert
Chaskin extensively document the uneasy relationship between former public
housing residents and market rate tenants who isolate and ostracize the lowerincome residents.268 In particular, the lower-income residents are not able to
represent their interests adequately in tenant meetings and experience
excessive policing for their “non-middle class behaviors.”269 Examples of the
bases of conflicts between working class black residents and affluent white
residents include barbecuing, congregating, Sunday parking for church, and
drumming in Harlem.270 Fraser writes:
Indeed, subsidized renters in mixed-income developments are
often the objects of intensified surveillance and discipline, in part
because site management is charged with drawing middle-income

265.
266.

267.
268.
269.
270.

Children: New Evidence From the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM. ECON.
REV. 855 (2016).
ROBERT J. CHASKIN & MARK L. JOSEPH, INTEGRATING THE INNER CITY: THE PROMISE AND
PERILS OF MIXED-INCOME PUBLIC HOUSING TRANSFORMATION (2015).
Indeed, Fraser et al. point out that many public housing residents who survived Hope VI
and are now working still qualify for public housing, which suggests the problem is
structural rather than due to a lack of role models. See Fraser, Chaskin & Bazuin, supra
note 262, at 95.
Robert J. Chaskin & Mark L. Joseph, Social Interaction in Mixed-Income Developments:
Relational Expectations and Emerging Reality, 33 J. URB. AFF. 209 (2011).
Id.
Id.
See Chaskin & Joseph, supra note 267 (describing conflicts over public gatherings and
barbecuing at picnic tables instead of in backyards); Robert McCartney, ‘Black
Nranding’—How a D.C. Neighborhood Was Marketed to White Millennials, WASH. POST,
(May 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/black-branding--how-a-dcneighborhood-was-marketed-to-white-millenials/2017/05/02/68b0ae06-2f47-11e79534-00e4656c22aa_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e9e78617d47a
[https://perma.cc/X7XY-A6RV] (“[L]obbying by new arrivals cost black churchgoers a
long-standing convenience of parking in a school playground on Sunday mornings.
Small, black-owned businesses that served as public gathering places have shut their
doors.”); Timothy Williams, An Old Sound in Harlem Draws New Neighbors’ Ire, N.Y. TIMES,
July 6, 2008 (police called over Harlem tradition of Saturday evening drumming).
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residents into these developments to capture enough ground rent
to offset the costs associated with a devolved public housing
program.271

Thus, physical integration does not only fail as a socially integrative
measure, but actually increases surveillance and control of low-income people.
As a result, marginalization, both inter- and intraracial, is prevalent in
mixed-income developments. The intraracial marginalization is significant
because this whole endeavor has been based on William Julius Wilson’s
observation that the inner city poor were being deprived of interaction with
higher classes of black people, and they would benefit from such exposure.272
Chaskin and Joseph observe that “[s]everal theoretical propositions that lie
behind this policy are based on assumptions about the ways in which living
among higher-income residents can lead to relationships and interactions
that may benefit poor people.”273 The combination of how difficult it is to
foster these interactions (as numerous authors have shown) and of the reality
that the number of poor have to be kept to a minimum lead the poor bear the
cost of that policy goal as a result. Accordingly, Khare, Joseph and Chaskin
tellingly observe:
The emerging prevalence of secondary marginalization in these
new mixed-income contexts is particularly important given that the
policy was in part based on the work of scholars such as Wilson
(2012) who contended that the Black middle class could play a
positive role as role models by returning to inner city
communities.274

This observation gets to the heart of the contradiction, and again raises
the questions that forcing an economic mix might 1) not be necessary and 2)
be done at the expense of the poor people in the community who are deprived
of the opportunity for valid status and legitimacy within their own peer
group.275 There is a back and forth between opacity and transparency in
271. See Fraser, Chaskin & Bazuin, supra note 262, at 90 (discussing the fact that in many
cases, young black men are identified as a threat when they “convene and converse in
public space”).
272. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 56 (1st ed. 1987).
273. Chaskin & Joseph, supra note 267, at 269.
274. Amy T. Khare, Mark L. Joseph & Robert J. Chaskin, The Enduring Significance of Race in
Mixed-Income Developments, 51 URB. AFF. REV. 474, 480 (2015).
275. See Kelly D. Owens, The Social Construction of a Public/Private Neighborhood: Examining
Neighbor Interaction and Neighborhood Meaning in a New Orleans Mixed-Income
Development, 1473 U. NEW ORLEANS THESES & DISSERTATIONS 1, 10 (2012) (noting that most
residents were trying to get out of the mixed-income community). “Market-rate
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mixed-income housing schemes. They call for transparency in having the
poor see how the well-off live but they also call for opacity by obscuring, as
much as possible, that the poor are present in the formerly exclusive enclaves
of the affluent.
E.

Managing Class Without Addressing Race—Microsegregation
and the Integration Paradox

Further problematic in the assumptions of mixing and cross-class
contact in mixed-income developments, is that research seems to indicate that
significant microsegregation, rather than integration, takes place in mixedincome communities.276 While mixed-income housing is appealingly and
expediently framed in race-neutral, market-based terms that emphasize price
point and housing tenure, the focus on income fails to acknowledge the racial
dynamics within mixed-income communities.
Studies indicate that
microsegregation takes place when there are visible markers of status
differences, such as race, use of public housing, and tenure.277 More crossclass contact takes place when there is homogeneity of status.278 In other
words, when class tracks race, assumptions, stigmatization, and segregation
result. Thus, instead of integration and inclusion, mixed-income housing
schemes promise to render the poor socially isolated because they ignore the
potential for microsegregation. This deprives the low-income resident of
status and a voice in their own community.279

276.

277.

278.
279.

residents were uncomfortable with the environment but constrained by rental leases;
public housing residents were being marginalized but did not have other housing
options; and homeowners, who were anxious about their investment in a neighborhood
that was still in the early stages of change, were confined by negative equity.” Id. Some
resident who had moved in with different expectations decided to accept the
neighborhood, had positive perceptions and were engaged. Id. These tended to be the
public housing and Section 8 residents mostly. Id.
See CHASKIN & JOSEPH, supra note 265. Chaskin and Joseph’s research shows that
microsegregation is an enduring feature of a significant number of mixed-income
housing developments; racial privilege and stigma plays a significant role in broadcasting
the presence of differences in status within mixed-income communities and defines
reactions of acceptance or exclusion. Id.
Laura Tach, Diversity, Inequality, and Microsegregation: Dynamics of Inclusion and
Exclusion in a Racially and Economically Diverse Community, 16 CITYSCAPE 13, 24, 26
(2014). Tach studied residents’ perceptions of their economically and racially diverse
neighborhood showed race- and class-based patterns of inclusion and exclusion in daily
routines, particularly in sublocal organizations, suggesting that neighborhood integration may
solve some problems of social exclusion while creating new problems of microsegregation. Id.
Tach, supra note 223, at 22.
Stereotypes about poor people are often silently connected to black spatial isolation leading not
only opposition to low-income housing, but opposition to the people themselves. See Laura
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Therefore, mixed-income schemes may work better in racially
homogeneous settings. This reflects how property markets react to the
presence of the socially stigmatized. Kushner observes that a study by Robert
Putnam shows greater racial and ethnic diversity makes white people
withdraw.280 According to J. Eric Oliver, this is because integration presents
a paradox of diversity and of community.281 Integration has been found to
bring greater cross-racial understanding, accompanied by more alienation.
First, racial hostility increases if there are greater numbers of racial minorities
at the metropolitan level—the paradox of diversity. Correspondingly, more
segregated neighborhoods correlate with more racial hostility. Yet, living
among people of different races in integrated neighborhoods is correlated
with less racial resentment, because there is more meaningful interracial
contact.282,283 People in integrated neighborhoods “have more interracial
social ties, participate in more interracial civic associations and work in more
integrated jobs” and are less likely to have racial hostility.”284 Notwithstanding
this positive effect from neighborhood integration, there is also a paradoxical
effect of community involvement decreasing.285 For members of racial
minorities, being “in a more integrated neighborhood means being less
socially connected in general and more alienated from one’s neighbors in
particular . . . For Americans, same-race neighborhoods provide a feeling of

280.

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Sullivan, Section 8 Vouchers Help the Poor—But Only If Housing is Available, NPR (May 10, 2017,
4:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/10/527660512 /section-8-vouchers-help-the-poor-butonly-if-housing-is-available [https://perma.cc/7DPE-GM56]. In comparison, white Section 8
holders live in the lowest poverty neighborhoods. See Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coalition, Who
Lives in Federally Assisted Housing?, 2 HOUSING SPOTLIGHT 4 (Nov. 2012),
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files /HousingSpotlight2-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP7W-BRH4].
For a similar point, see James A. Kushner, Urban Neighborhood Regeneration and the
Phases of Community Evolution After World War II in the United States, 41 IND. L. REV.
575, 599–601 (2008) (citing Michael Jonas, The Downside of Diversity: A Harvard
Political Scientist Finds That Diversity Hurts Civic Life. What Happens When a Liberal
Scholar Unearths an Inconvenient Truth?, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 5, 2007),
http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/08/05/the_downside_of_dive
rsity [https://perma.cc/ZY37-HK84] (noting a “diversity paradox” -- due to continued
racial hostility withdrawal from civic life is correlated with neighborhood diversity. The
more ethnically and racially diverse, the lower social capital and the higher distrust
among neighbors . . . . [Thus] a dispersed population does not necessarily generate an
assimilated, socially cohesive society.”).
J. ERIC OLIVER, THE PARADOXES OF INTEGRATION: RACE, NEIGHBORHOOD, AND CIVIC LIFE
IN MULTIETHNIC AMERICA 5–6 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
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community not available in a larger, diverse society.”286 Oliver argues that we
must pay attention to the costs of integration, which he points out are most
heavily borne by dark-skinned minorities.287 Oliver explains that there is an
unresolved tension between assimilative processes that “sustain social
cohesion” across the society, and those that maintain “cultural differences.”288
Oliver posits that “the real transformation in American racial attitudes
requires the elimination of ethnic, cultural and social markers that many
groups hold as a fundamental part of their identity and . . . this will do so at
the expense of darker-skinned people.”289 For example, Oliver notes that
many argue that Asian and Latino people should seek to transcend racial
barriers by becoming White, at the expense of Blacks.290 As a result, Oliver
concludes that the increasing racial diversity in the US will lead to greater
racial hostility and competition.291
Echoed by Laura Tach’s earlier work and by Chaskin and Joseph, Oliver’s
most critical finding for the mixed-income community is that equality or
similarity in income status is very important for racial understanding in
integrated communities:
According to social psychologists and social capital theorists,
interracial proximity is not sufficient for reducing racial hostility;
rather, if people are to overcome their racial animosities toward

286. Id.
287. Id. at 8. For a similar point see Calmore, supra note 154, at 1504–06 (“It is rare for blacks
and whites to experience both integrated housing and a sense of community. Blacks
demonstrate a history of integrating for a better housing package, not in quest of
community. Integrated housing seldom represents ‘a path to belonging.’ It is usually at
the expense of community that blacks improve their housing package in integrated
settings dominated by whites. The integration imperative is predicated on white
dominance and virtual assimilation by blacks as preconditions to whites accepting blacks
into their communities. . . . In light of the difficulty of linking home and community in
the context of residential integration, there is evidence that even middle-class blacks
increasingly value black community attachment and affiliation at the expense of
integration.” Accordingly, “the black middle class . . . has [managed] to attain the
benefits of socio-economic mobility without living in integrated neighborhoods.”). But
see Sharkey, supra note 145, at 903–54 (“Although all groups of African-Americans
continue to live in areas with greater levels of neighborhood disadvantage and spatial
disadvantage than other racial/ethnic groups, middle- and upper-income AfricanAmericans increasingly live in communities that are spatially separated from highly
disadvantaged neighborhoods. These changes are driven primarily by growth in the
proportion of middle- and upper-income African-Americans who live outside of central
cities and outside of majority-black neighborhoods.”).
288. OLIVER, supra note 281, at 8.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 8.
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other groups, they must do so through contact in very specific
circumstances (that is, all parties must be of equal status and work
together toward a shared goal.) In short, people in integrated
neighborhoods need to have structured interactions with other
races, whether . . . in a work setting or within a local civic
organization, to overcome their racial animosities.292

Oliver’s insights are echoed by other researchers’ work on the dynamics
of mixed-income neighborhoods. Skoba and Goetz question “housing
policies [emphasizing mobility] that, although seeking to improve the
conditions for very low-income families, disrupt vital social support systems
that help families meet basic needs.”293 According to Tach, the evidence
suggests that mixed-income approaches at the neighborhood level have
“modest ability to integrate the poor with near-poor or moderate-income
households, but these efforts prove difficult to sustain over time because of
the forces of residential mobility and neighborhood change.”294 Tach also
notes that “few project-based or voucher-based efforts have succeeded in
integrating lower-income residents into affluent neighborhoods.”295
However, her case study of Chester Square in the South End of Boston
suggests a model of how “project-based subsidies can be used when there are
motivated neighborhood actors who mobilize to preserve affordability in the
face of rising property values.”296 Nonprofit organizations mobilized early, at
the first sign of gentrification, to create affordable housing options that
seemed to fit well within the existing neighborhood.297
Mixed-income housing faces a very real challenge, as it seeks to integrate
by income, race plays a determining role in whether such communities
succeed. Cross-class interactions that also are cross-race interactions are
likely difficult, in part, because it is difficult to experience how much wealth
or how little someone has relative to another person. Experiencing that
292. Id. at 7.
293. Kimberly Skobba & Edward G. Goetz, Mobility Decisions of Very-Low Income
Households, 15 CITYSCAPE 188, 188 (2013) (questioning assumptions that very lowincome households’ housing outcomes are the result of considered choices and
demonstrating instead that relationships, rather than neighborhoods are the driving
factor in residential decisionmaking).
294. Laura Tach et al., Income Mixing Across the Scales: Rationale, Trends, Policies, Practice,
and Research for More Inclusive Neighborhoods and Metropolitan Areas, URBAN INST. 43,
43 (Jan. 2014), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/22226/412998Income-Mixing-across-Scales-Rationale-Trends-Policies-Practice-and-Research-for-MoreInclusive-Neighborhoods-and-Metropolitan-Areas.PDF [https://perma.cc/UL7L-VJJX].
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 41–42.
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difference across race violates racialized class expectations.298 At the very
least, it seems that managing discrimination in mixed-income policy may
require focusing on structuring mixed-income housing to take into account
proximity of income and status:299
[F]or mixing to have a role in making our cities more just, the
people being mixed need to be in proximity on their own terms and
those terms need some level of equivalence or
comparability. . . Thus, the broad consensus among those who
have studied social networks in Hope VI developments is that
improving the life opportunities of low-income residents cannot
hinge on social mixing.300

At the very least, more social science research is needed on the impact of
different aspects of mixed-income housing and resident interaction—the
effects of different income and tenure mixes, whether certain resident
governance structures are more beneficial than others, the extent and
durability of improved educational outcomes for children, and the impact of
the actual development’s design configuration on resident interaction.301
Perhaps such research might be guided by social contact theory, which
is frequently explored in other fields such as diversity in college admissions,
and which presumes that pursuing diversity in admissions requires paying
attention to and delineating distinct cohorts of students who are close to each
other in class status and experience. Social contact theory’s underlying
assumption is that equal status is one of the preconditions of flourishing in a

298. See OFFICE POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., Mixed-Income
Community Dynamics: Five Insights From Ethnography, EVIDENCE MATTERS (Spring 2013),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/spring13/highlight2.html
[https://perma.cc/N8LK-RYQ5]. See also Amie Thurber, Claire Riehle Bohmann & Craig
Anne Heflinger, Spatially Integrated and Socially Segregated: The Effects of Mixed-Income
Neighbourhoods on Social Well-Being, 55 URB. STUD. 1859, 1870–71 (2017) (“Spatial integration
requires proactive investment in preserving existing positive social networks, while at the same
time promoting social integration among residents of different backgrounds.”).
299. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1010 (“[S]ociological theory suggests that members
of lower-income households themselves might dislike the social environment of an
inclusionary development. Individuals tend to care a lot about their relative status in a
given social setting.”).
300. Fraser, Chaskin, & Bazuin, supra note 262, at 90.
301. DIANE K. LEVY, ZACH MCDADE & KASSIE DUMLAO, URBAN INST., EFFECTS FROM LIVING IN MIXEDINCOME COMMUNITIES FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 4–5, 14 (2010)
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/27116/412292-Effects-from-Living-inMixed-Income-Communities-for-Low-Income-Families.PDF [https://perma.cc/HY3J-6FJE]
(conducting a literature review of mixed-income housing strategies confirming some benefits
but concluding such strategies are insufficient for overcoming social barriers and alleviating
poverty).
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diverse environment, and the foundation for acceptance and tolerance.
Similarly, mixed-income housing’s already imperfect endeavor may require
attention to structuring mixes of residents in terms of cohorts of status.302
This of course begs the question about whether the goal of mixing may truly
be fulfilled. The poor door controversy in NYC was at least caused by mixing
hyper luxury and moderate income and involved a wide a gap in economic
and social status. Lack of mixing, aversion, and disdain were built into the
building’s design on a number of levels. In a society that does not explicitly
acknowledge class divisions, specifically racialized class divisions, designing
cohorts in mixed-income housing will be a problematic endeavor that will
vary based on context. In certain circumstances, the elite can be so
comfortable with their self-perceptions of their own status that the poor do
not threaten their status identity. For example, elite academics may achieve
their status through educational accomplishments, and tend to have
comparatively less need to obtain status through consumption of material
goods, like one’s home for someone who is middle or lower middle class.
F.

Managing Without Addressing Gentrification
and the Concentration of Affluence303

Mixed-income housing is viewed as an antidote to gentrification, yet it
is not fully acknowledged that in very tight housing markets, it can be used to
gentrify existing low-income neighborhoods under the guise of doing fair and
equitable mixed-income development.304 By definition, the predominant
housing unit type available in mixed-income housing are not affordable units

302. See Peter Arcidiacono et al., A Conversation on the Nature, Effects, and Future of
Affirmative Action in Higher Education Admissions, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 683, 698, 703–
07 (2015) (debating the causes and effects of social mismatch theory in the context of
affirmative action; is there too great a social distance between underrepresented
minorities and whites that are detrimental to performance, or does diversity enhance
perspective and shared values among students who are racially/ethnically different).
303. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17–21 (2006)
(arguing that concentrated affluence should be the focus, not just concentrated poverty
because concentrated affluence magnifies the impact of racism in the psychology of the
real estate market); Douglas S. Massey, The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence and
Poverty in the Twenty-First Century, 33 DEMOGRAPHY 395, 399, 407 (1996) (predicting
the divergence and distance between the social worlds of the rich and poor in twentyfirst century caused by “geographic concentration of affluence and poverty”).
304. See DEREK S. HYRA, RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS IN THE CAPPUCCINO CITY (2017)
(describing the complex interplay of gentrification in mixed race, mixed income
communities in Washington DC); Glynn, supra note 72, at 64.
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but rather market rate units.305 They can be used in existing low-income
communities to provide more units for the affluent with only a set aside for
lower-income residents.
Accordingly, Robert Chaskin observes:
[T]he narrative arc of public housing policy enactment and reform
is not merely a story about housing the poor, but more broadly
about the appropriation and reappropriation of urban space in
succeeding efforts to reenvision, reclaim, and remake parts of the
city that have become “discredited” by poverty, crime, and physical
decay and to build in their place new, wholesome, reimagined
communities. In pursuing these broader goals of urban renewal,
public housing policies in different phases both reflect a set of moral
judgments about the poor and are framed by a set of moral claims
that justify the need for demolition, relocation, development, and
resettlement. Within this process, residents moved out to make way
for redevelopment constitute a small minority of those who move
back.306

Thus, the most underdeveloped aspect of mixed-income housing theory
may be its emphasis on problematizing the concentration of poverty without
similarly problematizing the concentration of affluence, of which it is also a
manifestation. What conclusions would we reach if we fully acknowledged
that the primary force behind income segregation is concentration of
affluence? According to Tach, the rise in racially segregated, high poverty
neighborhoods is partly a function of increasing income inequality and a
concomitant growth in economic segregation.307 It turns out, however, “the
rich are considerably more segregated from the non-rich than the poor are from
the non-poor.”308 Tach argues that the segregation of affluence is a greater concern
because the it expanded at the same time that segregation of poverty grew.309
Beyond reducing the odds of cross-class contact, the segregation of the affluent
may reduce their support for investments that benefit cities or support
regional integration. It also may reduce the chances that less-affluent

305. See URBAN INST., supra note 36, at 4 (describing the percentage of units in market rate
developments in Montgomery County, Maryland and Fairfax County, Virginia as ranging from
a mere 6.25 percent to 15 percent).
306. Robert J. Chaskin, Book Review, 119 AM. J. SOC. 1788 (2014) (reviewing VALE, supra note 126).
307. TACH, PENDALL & DERIAN, supra note 218, at 12–13.
308. Id. at 12.
309. Id. at 12–13.
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residents will benefit from the positive spillovers of public goods in affluent
areas, like schools.310
In addition, sociological theory suggests that members of lower-income
households themselves might dislike the social environment of an
inclusionary development. Individuals tend to care a lot about their relative
status in a given social setting.311 In particular, Ellickson’s critique gets to the
heart of the class tension within mixed-income housing but overlooks a subtle
but important point. Implicit in his critique is the right to places that are
exclusive to high-income people.312 While this is certainly an accepted reality
in today’s society, articulating its basis is difficult, if not problematic. He
considers that lower-income people might share the preference, but states that
their preferences are not solicited. Thus, the preference of the affluent will
likely prevail. As John Calmore observed, integration decision-making
involves a process of tradeoffs in access to goods like safe neighborhoods,
schools, and other positional and status goods, but this access comes with
personal costs.313 Thus, the decision not to integrate may stem from seeking
protection from discrimination, rather than merely aversion. This protective
choice reflects other choices that have been made for you. As a result, the real
question may not be a particular decision to self-segregate, but instead to
ensure that there are options. The choices exercised by the wealthy and the
poor will not be the same.
The problem is not really that the mixed-income model is based on
somewhat misconceived or unproven ideals. Instead, the problem is that

310. Id. at 13 (“Since the 1970s, income inequality in the United States has grown, with the
upper tail of the income distribution pulling away from the rest . . . . More unequal
places also tend to be more segregated . . . .”).
311. See Chaskin & Joseph, supra note 267, at 232. (“[Because of the] relationship between
diversity and social cohesion[,] [t]he intentional diversity of unit type, income, and
housing tenure status in [mixed-income] contexts has led to a population characterized
by . . . fairly extreme social distances, throwing the challenges of creating social cohesion
and interaction among a heterogeneous population into stark relief.”).
312. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1009 (observing that “the choice of the optimal social milieu
for the pursuit of economic integration . . . is a difficult one” and noting with approval
that the first Mount Laurel decision only required inclusionary housing at selected
locations within a city’s boundaries while “explicitly bless[ing] the use of zoning to set
aside some neighborhoods as exclusive”).
313. Calmore, supra note 154, at 1505–06 (“It is rare for blacks and whites to experience both
integrated housing and a sense of community. Blacks demonstrate a history of
integrating for a better housing package, not in quest of community. Integrated housing
seldom represents ‘a path to belonging.’ It is usually at the expense of community that
blacks improve their housing package in integrated settings dominated by whites. The
integration imperative is predicated on white dominance and virtual assimilation by blacks as
preconditions to whites accepting blacks into their communities.”).
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mixed-income housing in our national milieu plays the role of discrimination
management. Mixed-income housing may cost more, may not be hospitable,
and may be based on social superiority, but it has been deployed as a way to
avoid middle- and upper middle-class opposition to low-income housing.
This very feature is the obstacle to its success. As mixed-income housing
incorporates the features of what it takes to avoid discrimination, it also takes
on other discriminatory assumptions in order to do so. Managing
discrimination requires taking on the mindset of those who would
discriminate, allowing the discriminator’s perspective to permeate the choice and
design of mixed-income housing. Thus, the mixed-income model subordinates as
it tries to provide a door of opportunity for those seeking to escape concentrated
poverty and access affordable, safe, advantageously located housing. Perhaps
this is inevitable, but it is worth noting in the hope that the ugly reflection in the
mirror will allow us to see mixed-income housing for what it is. We must not
consider it impossible for low-income people to live in a attractive, healthy,
affordable community of their own where they have valor and stature within
the community.
We also need more thought and discussion about protecting the desire
for status through controlling or avoiding “others.” We structure mixedincome housing in a way that reflects not just the way the market rate tenant
sees the world, but also how they see the lower-income resident. We assume
that exclusively high-income communities are acceptable. Before the law
accepts that assumption, it must acknowledge that the endeavor is filled with
other assumptions that reflect social domination, rather than the amelioration
of a social ill. Discrimination may be inevitable, but instead of catering to it
we need to own the source—our own discriminatory status assumptions—
and understand the different ways in which people obtain status. Everyone
needs the illusion of status. Everyone needs a voice. Everyone would like
choice. Accordingly, at the very least, an affordable housing development
may properly consist of housing devoted solely to the needs of the lower
income.
CONCLUSION
Mixed-income housing and its unexamined compromises around
discrimination management reflect the tensions between the goals of
inclusion within a society structured around the interests, and the preferences
of the affluent, which often are for exclusion and separation. As a policy,
mixed-income housing policy disrupts the social meaning and expectations
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of members of a society who are increasingly accustomed to thinking of
themselves as customers entitled to what they can pay for. This leads to the
belief that money is the measure of who is desirable in a community, and who
is so undesirable that they will ruin a community. Ultimately, these
expectations inform the policy about the number of poor and black people
who can live in one development or one neighborhood and be socially
desirable, and therefore economically sustainable over time. Because mixedincome policy surreptitiously addresses racial segregation under cover of the more
politically expedient goal of economic integration, it renders racial subordination
invisible. The logic of the market at once naturalizes and makes invisible negative
racial outcomes. Thus, mixed-income housing may be appropriate at some times
and in some places. This Article debunks the given justifications of social
mixing, role modeling, and social control. So, is there a good justification? When
and how should discrimination be managed?
The beginnings of an answer comes from social domination theory
which neutrally observes that any society is characterized by social
domination manifesting according to the culture and history of a particular
society.314 Sidanius and Pratto have categorized societal practices as either
domination enhancing (DE) and domination ameliorating (DA) practices.315
Mixed-income housing is perceived and promoted as a domination
ameliorating practice, but as this Article has demonstrated mixed-income
housing is a technique for accommodating or enhancing, rather than
ameliorating, discrimination. The lesson for mixed-income housing from
social domination theory is to scrutinize mixed-income housing policy, and
indeed, all housing policy, for its domination enhancing and domination
ameliorating characteristics. The insight of discrimination management is
that it provides a way to change the focus on practices that we think are
domination ameliorating but are actually better characterized as domination
enhancing. Further empirical study is required to explore how to evaluate the
balance. The poor door controversy arose within a mixed-income housing
scheme whose purpose was to ameliorate hierarchy by providing centrally
located housing to those in need. The poor doors attempted to sidestep
discrimination, while catering to it.
Until we acknowledge the tension between our stated desires for
inclusion and the public and private practices of exclusion through a market
economy that sells status through exclusion, we will continue to craft policies

314. SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 88, at 31–32.
315. Id. at 38–39.
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that vacillate between two extremes. Announcements of the latest luxury high
rise development and the concentration of affluence it represents contrast with
stories of where the displaced end up—neighborhoods characterized by the
seemingly separate phenomenon of poverty, which leads to violent crime,
homelessness, and police brutality.316 The occurrence of both phenomena
simultaneously tells us that gentrification’s concentration of wealth presents
a problem of cultural dominance of elites and the reordering of society’s
amenities to meet their needs exclusively. As of this writing, mixed-income
housing may be our best hope, but if it is, segregation and the shortage of
affordable housing will continue to be the problems we fail to overcome.

316. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Fragile Baltimore Struggles to Heal After Deadly Police
Encounter, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/us/afragile-baltimore-struggles-to-heal-itself.html [https://perma.cc/H3XU-YU5K].

